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PREFACE 
ihis study cQncentrates on the activities ot Joseph c. Morehead 
a,ncl William Walker, the first 4nglo-/lmerican filibusters to invade 
northwestem Mexico. Al,tbough many conflicts ot interest occurred be-
tween Mexico and the United States in the ~ars intervening between 
the Treaty of' Guadalupe and. the Gadsden Purchase, little attention has 
been devo~ed by historians to tilibuis~ering activity during this 
period. In tnis study a na?Tative ot the expeditions will be given, 
bu,t the major concem will be the reasons Walk.er and Morehead raided 
SC!>no;ra and aaja California and the effect that their intrusions had 
uj>on the American and Mexican governments. Were Morehead and Walk.er 
patri.ots, or pirates? 
I inust express my appreciation to all the people who contributed 
to the research and writing of this thesis. Many staff members of the 
Oldaboma State University Library were very helpful in obtaining 
materials on micro.film. However, I must personally thank Dr. Odie B. 
Faulk 9t the OJ.c:J.Wioma State University history department for his 
encouragement, under13tandipg and constructive criticism, as well as 
Dr. Home:r L. Knight, head of the department • 
.!.!.! 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
With the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, it appeared to many 
citizens that the United States had stopped growing physically. Since 
the :fo:nnation of the Republic, the expansion of America had. been so 
sweeping and so rapid that rqany refused to believe that the "era of 
p:rogress" was at an end and that a permanent international boundary 
had been &grfited upon between the United States and Mexico •. To some 
visionary statesmen and journalists, the extension of American insti-
tutions and the annexation of more land was "manifest destiny,"_and any 
act:i,on committed in its name justified the cause. To them it was "the 
fate of America ever to go ahead, She is like the rod of Aaron that 
became a serpent and swallowed up the other rods. So will Ame~ica 
conquer or annex all. lands. That is her "manifest destiny'•.1 To these 
individuals, A~ricans had proven themselves the most progressive of 
the world. The recent treaty with Mexico was regarded only as a 
temporary stumbling bloc. They would find a new course on which to 
tre.vel, and new territory in which to settle would soon be taken. 
But to others, "manifest destiny'' was only an excuse. Adventure 
and intrigue was their game; private :fortune was their reward. Ther 
1Frank Soule, John H. Gihon, James Nisbet, The Annals of San 
Francisco, comp. by Dorothy H. Huggins (Palo AltO:Lewis Osbo'me;- 1966), 
P• 470. 
took international law into their own hands and called u:PPn others to 
,• 
share the profits of' their glory, They were "filibusters," and only 
their success or failure determined whether or not they were exponents 
of "manifest dest;i.ny". Such was the case wit,~( Joseph Morehead and 
William Walker, the first Anglo-American filibusters to r~li northern 
Mexico. 2 
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had lef't Mexicans with a profound 
suspicion of' the United States. The events th.at took place along the 
new intemat:l.onal border between 1848 and 1854 only d.eepen~d that dis-
trust. Also, the Mexican governnent believed that the United States 
was not fulfilling its ob:l.igations under th'1 treaty. Article XI had 
specifically stated that the United States was bound to restrain the 
2 
Indians within the newly acquired territory and to maintain the security 
of the Mexican frontier. 3 . Secretary of State James Buchanan informed 
the Mexican foreign minister that the United States government possessed 
"both the ability and the will to restrain the Indians within the ex-
tended limits of the United States from making incursions into the 
Me:xican territories, as well as to execute all the other stipulations of 
the 11th article."4 With the Gadsden Purchase the United States was 
2rhe Spanish equivalent is ''i'ilibustero" meaning "freebooter." 
In this paper the word is used in reference to those who engaged in 
outfit ting and conducting through their own private initiative, an 
armed expedition from the United States in an attempt to seize 
territory f'rom Mexico by force and intrigue. · 
3wu1iam M. Malloy, comp., Treaties, Conventions, International 
Acts, Protocols ~ A~reements between 2 United States 2! America 
!ru!, Other Powers, 177 -1909 (2 vols.; Washington: Gevemment Printing 
Office, 1910), I, PP• 1112-1113. 
4congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 2nd session, (1848-1849), 
Vol. XIX, P• 495. 
released from the obligations of Article XI. Until then, however, it 
appeared to the Mexican government that there was a lack of good faith 
on the part of the United States to enforce that "will" or "ability. "5 
3 
Prior to the treaty of 1848, bands of Apaches continually had made 
devastating raids into Sonora. From 1832 to 1849, over two hundred 
residents were murdered inside Fort Fronteras. Because of this killing 
and robbing, the northern portion of the state was gradually depopu-
lated, missions and settlements disappeared, and mines were abandoned, 6 
As late as the summer of 1852 it was reported that areas "once inhabited 
by a peaceful and happy population are now deserted and the fertile 
valleys they tilled are revE:irting to the condition of a wilderness."7 
Now that a treaty existed, Mexico naturally expected these depredations 
to cease. 
To the United States Congress, however, Article XI entailed more 
than just securing the frontier from Indian raids into Mexico. Since 
Spanish times the Comanches, Apaches, Utahs, Navajos, Kiowas, and Yumas 
5J. Fred Rippy,- "The Indians.of. the Southwest :in the Diplomacy, 
of the United States and Mexico, 1848-1853," Hispanic American His-
torical Review, II (1919), PP• 394-396. · 
6Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of 2 North Mexican States and 
Texas { 2 vols. ; San Francisco: The History Company Publishe11s, 1884-
1889), II, p. 653; Robert C. Stevens, "The Apache Menace in Sonora, 
1831-1849," Arizona and the West, VI {Autumn, 1964), PP• 211-222; John 
c. Cremony, Life Among the"°Apaclies {San Francisco: A. Roman and 
Company, 186~pp. 35-46. Reprinted in 1969 by The Rio Grande Press, 
Inc. Cremony was the interpreter for John R. Bartlett, commissioner 
for the boundary survey from 1849 to 1851. He gives an excellent des-
cription of the fear that the Mexicans on the Sonoran frontier had of 
the Apaches. 
7John Russell Bartlett, Personal Narratives of Eeploration and 
Incidents •• • {2 vols.; New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1854), 
II, p • .385. Reprinted in 1965 by the Rio Grande Press, 
4 
had been terrorizing the northern frontier. Now approximately 120,000 
of these ::J;ndiane resided in the newly acquired territory, and the United 
States government was confronted with a three-fold task. Not only must 
it keep the border Indians from raiding settlements in Mexico; it also 
. " 
had to la;lep the tribes at peace with one another, as well as protect 
United States citizens from the hostile Indians. 8 Furthermore, while 
attempting to fulfill these obligations, the government also wanted to 
reduce military expenditures. While Congressmen ·debated the merits 
and shortcomings of a reasonable solution, the Apache raids into Sonora 
continued. 9 
On the other hand, United States officials were not hesitant. to 
inform Mexico that it too had responsibilities in protecting its border-
lands. In his annual mesaage to Congress in December, 1851, President 
Millard Fillmore pointed out that the United States was trying to en-
force the treaty stipulations, but since American troops could not be 
stat:l.oned on Mexican soil, there was no way that a co-operative effort 
10 
could be executed. Secretary of War c. M. Conrad was extremely 
critical of Mexican attempts to control the Sonoran frontier. . To him, 
the weaknesa or the Mexican federal government and the constant civil 
strife that existed throughout the republic severel,y impaired its in-
fiuence over the Navajos and Apaches "who know no right but power and 
8Hubert Howe Bancroft, Historz 2! Arizona ~ ~ Me~co, 1530-
1888i (San Francisco: The Hietory Company Publiehers, 1889), p. 459; 
Rippf., "The Indians of the Soutbwest," p. 366. . ·. ·. ·.· . 
9Rippy, ''The Indians of the Southwest," p. 370. 
1'\>resident Millard Filll!lore' s Annual Message to both Houses of 
Congresa, December 2, 1851, House Executive Document ~' 32d Congres.s, 
1st session, Vol. II, pt. 1, PP• 18-1,9. · 
5 
no motive but the fear of its exercise.nll 
7 In many instances, when the military force of either nation did 
take pun:i,tive action against the marauding Indians, it only intensified 
the distress cau21ed to Sonorans. These Indians frequently dealt with 
Mexican and Amer:i,can traders on both sides of the border who supplied 
them with guns and ammunit~ons in exchange for stolen articles, such as 
livestock, as well as women and children taken from Sonoran ~owns. As 
the United States troops could not cross over to Mexican territory, 
the lndians only advanced deeper into Sono:ran territo,ry.12 
Mexico did, however, make several attempts between 184S and 1854 
to secure its northem frontier, Less than six months after the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo had been signed, Jose Joaquin de Herrera, President 
of Mexico, recognized the necessity of defending the frontier states 
and signed into law a decree providing tor the establishment of 
eighteen military colonies along Mexico's northern bo'Ulldary. The 
colonies were to serve a dual purpose. One was to eetablish them as 
centers of defense to deter the Indian incursions in the region. The 
second was to use each one as a nucleus for a civilian population, who, 
hopefully would prevent the aggressive Americans, from taking more 
territory from Mexico.13 
The colonies were divided into three divisions, called the 
l'rontier'~f·:;:t:.he: East, the Frontier of Chihuahua, and the Frontier of 
11:aepo:rt of the Secretary of War, House Executive Document 2, 
32d Congress, 1st session, Vol. II, pt. 1, P• l<::r/. ,. -
12ibid.; Bancroft, Histo7 2l Arizona ~~Mexico, P• 459· 
13odie B. Faulk, trans., "Projected Mexican Military Colonies for 
the Borderlands, 1S4S," Journal 2! Arizona W,stou, IX (Spring, 196S), 
P• 39. 
6 
the West. Enlistment was voluntary, and recruits were to be attracted 
thro~h advanced pay and supplies, generous land grants, bounties, tax 
exemptions, and a guarantee of anned assistance.14 
On the Frontier of the West five colonies were to be alloted to 
Sonora at Altar, Tucson, Babispe, Santa Cruz, and Fronteras. Due to 
the turmoil in the supreme government, however, only one colony, 
Fronteras, had been properly planted by 1S50. Santa Cruz had been es-
tablished, but was struggling for survival. The other three had not 
been located.15 
Baja California was the other state on the Frontier of the West 
and was granted one colony, to be established at Rosario. Colonel 
Ra.fael Espinqsa, the military commander of the peninsula, was to be the 
inspector of the projected settlement, while Captain Manuel Castro was 
designated to initiate the undertaking. By the end of 1S50 the colony 
had made so little progress that it was moved to Santo Tomas, Here, 
despite insufficient supplies, lack of funds and competent military 
protection, the population of the settlement had reached nearly two 
16 hundred by June , 1S51. 
During the same year, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco 
Castillo Negrete was appointed as Captain Castro's superior. But as 
soon as he arrived to assume his duties, Lieutenant Chaves, Castro's 
aide, promptly arrested Negrete and sent him back to La Paz. Military 
command then degenerated into chaos, and civil strife broke out as rival 
14rbid., PP• 41-43. 
l5Bancroft, History 2f North Mexican States, II, P• 671. 
16Ibid., PP• 720-721.. 
7 
,. 
leader!'3 began strivj,ng for supremacy~ Before the ~ar ended, disorder 
and disertion was the rule of the day, and the colony wasted away.17 
Although the national government did nothing to remedy these 
anarchic conditions, it was obvious that the settlement was not ful-
filling the two major goals or the colonization plan. The population 
was never large enough effectively to combat the Indians, and the 
location was too far inland to prevent the landing by sea or American 
interlopers and adventurers. By 1850, not only were Mexicans failing 
to respond to the supreme government's appeal to join the military 
colonies, but also the bo:rder states were losing many or their native 
inhabitants to a more attractive venture. Gold had been discovered in 
American Califo:rn,ia, and the,.Mexican,1.flrontier popul,ation was anxious 
to share in the new wealth. 
Between October, 1848, and March, 1849, more than five thousand 
people departed Sonora for the gold fields, and during the first four 
months or 1850 another six tho~sand left.18 The gold discoveries lured 
away not only citizens, but also anny troops and even heads or depart-
ments. To one army captain, it appeared as if the whole state of 
Sonora was on the move.19 In April, 1851, the San Francisco Daily Alta 
reported that more than ten thousand Mexicans had arrived in .the Mari-
posa and Tuolumne region, most of them from Sonora and Lower Cali-
17Ibid. 
18&iph J. RQske, "The World Impact of the California Gold Rush, 
1~9-1857," Arizona~~~' V (Autumn, 1963), p. 198. 
l9Hubert Howe Bancroft, History 2! California (~ vols,; San ~'::, : .. ) 
Francisco:1:"~ 1ThehHi~to.ff 1 :Corop~y PUblishers, 1864-1889), VI, p. 113. 
fornia,20 By 1B50, the Mexican migration had reached a peak. So 
many had left areas in Sonora that hardly enough food was raised for 
the consumption of the people. Indian incursions increased, and those 
who had remained were practically defenseless. 21 
B 
At first the Mexicans were welcomed in California because of their 
knowleQ8e in mining techniq~s. But as their numbers increased, reac-
tion and discrimination set in. The Mexican government protested, but 
to no avail. Many of the Mexicans then began returning home, while 
others stayed to become laborers in the quartz mines. 22 The effect 
of the gold rush on Sonora and Baja California was manifested both 
directly and indirectly, One result was the depopulation of the 
frontier which Mexico was venturing to colonize. The other provided 
an excuse for those Anglo-Americans who failed to "strike it rich" in 
California. 
Even after the conclusion of the Mexican War, many Americans con-
tinued to demand the fulfillment of "manifest destiny" to acquire all 
the "territory lying between the Sierra Madre and tbe Rio Grande, 
Chihuahua, Sonora, Sina,loa and Lower California and the reserved right 
to take more by purchase or force whenever it may be wanted. 1123 It is 
always difficult to prove the emotional temperament of a people, and 
20Daily Alta California (San Francisco), April 21, 1B51. Here-
after cited as D,A.C, 
~artlett, Personal Narratives, I, pp. 2B3-2B4, 
22aodrnan w. Paul, California Q21.!!: The Beginning of Min~ in the 
Far West (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1947); p. 2i Roske 
"The Woi=°ld lmpact of the California Gold Rush," p. 199; Ralph P. 
Bieber, "California Gold Mania," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XXXV (June, 194B), PP• 12-13. · . 
23~., September B, 1853· 
9 
such is the case in analyzing the "spirit of manifest destinY''. Regard-
less of the mo:r;-al aspect of the tenn, many Americans were eager to add 
more lands to the fast growing nation. When James K~ Polk submitted 
the negotiated pro.1et,~op:;_th~ treaty with Mexico to his cabinet, Secre-
ta:r;"y' of State Buchanan protested vigorously that it did not include 
Mexican territory to the Sierra Madre line. Polk p:refe::i;-red more terri-
tory, but because of his fears of Mexican objections and Whig opposi-
tion, he was willing to settle for less than he had wanted. 24 
To Ame:r;-ican expansionists, the boundary line fixed by the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo was only a temporary barrier to the southward 
progress of American democracy and rule. In his Memoir of a Tour, an 
------
American physician attached to Colonel Alexander w. Doniphan' s expedi-
tion expressed the expansionist. attitude toward Mexico. He thought 
the northern half of Mexico could be utilized by "a great commercial 
nation like the United States, with new states springing up on the 
Pacific because of the new connections that it would open with the 
Pacific, for the great mineral resources of the country, and t'or ;its 
peculiar adaptation for stock raising." The harbor of Guaymas could 
be connected by railroad. with the Rio Grande and "give a new thorough-
fare from the Atlantic to the Pacific, for commerce as well as for the 
emigration to California and Oregon. Policy, as well as humanity 
demands such an extension of the area of freedom for mankind." 25 
24Frederick Merk, Manifest Psstiny and Mi§sion !!!, American 
ljistorz: a_ Reinteipretation (New York: A. A. Knopf, 196.3), P• 186. 
25Adolphus Wislizenus, Memoir of a Tour to Northern Mexico, 
Senate Miscellaneous Document 26, .30th Congre·ss, 1st sesf;!ion, p. 85 • 
. " ' . ' ....... 
10 
This was the type of attitude that seriously worried Mexican 
officials, especially as their colonization plan was proving such a 
dismal failure. Because of its proximity and·its unusually rich 
mineral resources, Sonora became the natural objective of the ad-
venturous and discontented Forty-Niners. In January, 1850, Jose de 
Aguilar, Govemor of Sonora, complained to the Mexican national govem-
ment of t'requent incursions by Americans on their way to Califomia, 
and told of rumors that Americans were planning to establish colonies 
al,ong the right bank of the Gila. In the spring, Don Luis de la Rosa, 
the Mexican minister in Washington, notified Secretary of State John 
M. Clayton that armed. parties of Americans, some claiming to be 
emissaries of the United States govemment, had, entered Sonoran terri-
tQry and provided, the Apaches with guns and a.mrrrunition. The Americans 
in tum purchased the goods that the Indians had taken from the help-
less frontier population. 26 
Failing ta impress upon the United States government the fear and 
apprehension that· Mexico was suffering from Ang;l..o-American aggression, 
De la Rosa decided to remind the United States of its treaty obliga-
tions, hoping indirectly to call attention to the violation of Mexican 
terri.torial integrity of Mexico by American citizens. Oil March 20, 
.... lll.850, he complained to Clayton that American military might had not 
been e!fective in repressing Indian incursions. He felt these inci-
dents prevented "the establishinent and increase of those relations 
· 'of" ·amity and co~rce between the people of the frontiers of Mexico 
26Rufus Kay Wyllys, The French in Sonora, 1850-1824 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1932), PP• 50-51. 
and of the United States which would be so advantageous to both 
:republic~h "Z7 But raids continued, and in December he pointed out to 
11 
the new Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, that it was "daily becoming 
more and more indispensible that the government of the United States 
should adopt the promptest and most active measures in order to pre-
vent •• ,the incursions of the Indian savages of the United States upon 
the population of the Mexican frontier. 1128 
Tired of waiting for either of the countries national governments 
to take action, the Sonoran legislature on May 6, 1850, passed its own 
colonization plan. This provided for liberal land grants, advanced 
supplies and aid, and even went so far as to establish a civil and 
political program for the colonists and emeresarios. But before the 
program could be implemented it was declared unconstitutional by the 
29 
supreme government. 
Not all Mexican statesmen were willing to sit idly by while the 
American imminence lingered and the savages cont:i,nued to plunder the 
frontier. To Mariano Paredes, a representative of Sonora in the 
Chamber of Deputies in Mexico City, the success of Americans in the 
Mexican War, plus their discovery of gold in California, would always 
pose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of Sonora and Lower 
California. When he addressed the Chamber of Deputies on August 16, 
Z7Senate Executive Document 44, 31st Congress, 1st session, Vol. X 
P• 2. 
28House Executive Document ~' 31st Congress 2nd session, Vol. II, 
P• 1. 
29Patricia R, Herring, "A Plan for the Colonization of Sonora's 
Northern Frontier: The Paredes Proyectos of 1850, 11,~ournal of Arizona 
Historz, x (Summer, 1969), p. 106. 
12 
18;0, he stated that Americans would continue to settle their border-
land~, and eventually would expand into Sonora to acquire new wealth 
from its vast gold and silver deposits unless Mexico took appropriate 
measures to secure its frontier and successfully colonize the area.30 
He went on to explain: 
Sonora in its present state of abandonment, or misery, 
or insecurity, or lack of protection and guarantees of liberty, 
is exasperated and has lost all hope of survival; and it would 
not be impossible that the madness of its sufferings would 
cause it to throw itself into the hands of a neighoor that 
offers help, protection, and in fine, an enchanting and 
improved way of life .... ,. ....... The strip or land on the opposite side 
will soon be populated, Meanwhile, on our side, years will 
pass without the same thing happening because of laws enacted 
but impossible to execute.Jl 
Paredes proposed a plan which would enable either Mexican or European 
colonization. Like the plan of 1848, many inducements were offered 
to attract colonists; for the first twenty-five years exemptions from 
extraordinary state taxes, national taxes and tariffs were prolilised.. 
Land grants were pledged to both farmers and ranchers. Stipulations 
for the goveming of each colony were outlined, and guarantees against 
military occupation were drafted. 32 
Paredes hoped it would be individual Mexicans who would avail 
themselves of the colon!Lzation scheme, but conditions were also made 
for the empresario, be he Mexican or European. For each one hundred 
male colonists over twenty-five years of age an empresario might bring, 
: ... _ .... :3°odie B. Faulkr. Too Far North. ~ ... Tao .Far .-South (Los Angeles: 
Westernl.ore Press, 197lf}, pp. 109-110. - -
· · . · 3~0die. B, Faulk, trans., "A Colonization Plan for Northern 
Sonora, · 1s50, ,,. New Menco Hisf.oricB.l :Rev-iew,'- ~I-V_ (Oet<?b~·~, 1969), 
pp .. : ~98.~.~99 .• · .. '· .. ~ . ." .... -· ....... ·. : .. : . . ·,_: . . . : . . , ' : 
32rhid., PP• 305-307. 
he would be granted extra town land for houses, irrigable as well as 
pen irrigable farm land, and specific sites f~r stock raising • .3.3 
' 
1.3 
The second part of Pared.es' plan was to encourage the development 
of commerce by declaring Guaymas a duty-free port for twenty-five years. 
He felt this would enable men with capital to develop business and 
industry. By mak:Lng Guaymas not only a major center of economic 
activity, but also one of population; the city would serve to curb 
American ambitions in Baja California across the narrow gulf. Paredes 
wa$ af~id that unless Sonora and Baja California had a stable, eco-
nomically independent population, the United States would be able to 
lure the residents of both states away from their loyalty to the 
Mexican gove~nt and incite them to revolt • .34 
Unfortu,nately, Paredes' proposal was never acted upon by the 
Chamber of Deputies. Had his program been ad.opted and put into 
effect, it ~1;robably would have expanded the populating of Sonora and 
Baja California to such an extent that the Indian raids ;could have been 
halted and the Yankee threat diminished. l3ut as it was rejected, the 
Mexican government was forced to consider another colonization plan 
two years later, which al.so failed and thus paved the way for foreign 
military colonists to undertake the protection of the frontier. 
Meanwhile, the Indian depredations continued, and American ex-
ponents of manifest destiny continued to clamor for the Sierra Madre 
line. ;Also, adventurers from every comer of the earth had arrived 
in California by the early 1850' s. Disappointed in finding reality 
Qelow their expectations, many turned their eyes toward the mountains 
.3.3Ibid. 
34Ibid., PP• .30.3-304. 
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of Sonora and the precious metals of the Gila Valley. This group of 
fortune hunters, who dreamed only of sudden and easy acquisitions, 
:found the unpopulated and scantily popu1ated areas of northem Sonora 
and Baja Cali:fomia a likely spot to :fulfill their ambitions. 
Following the cession of Alta Cali:fomia to the United States in 
February, 1$48, some observers described its political status as part 
military, part civil, and part "no government at all." In localities 
unaffected by the infiux of gold seekers, Mexican laws and institu!"" 
tions continued to :function. Later, mining .conumm.ities set up their 
own rules and regulations along democratic principles, and newly cre-
ated cities :found workable :forms of govemment to meet their needs. 35 
Such a situation could not last, and by the spring of 1$49, 
Bennett Riley, military gosemor of the territory, issued a proclama-
tion :for a general election to a state constitutional convention. By 
October the convention had completed its deliberatipns and adjoumed; 
a month later the constitution :for a state g~vernment was ratified 
by residents of the area. The Congressional struggle over the 
adnU.ssion of California as a state, however, was wrapped up in the 
historic Compromise of 1850 :for another year. Finally, on September 
9, 1850, President Fillmore signed into law the measure admitting 
California to the Union.36 
Even after statehood, Cali:fomia was still a land :full of ad-
venturers thirsting :for gold and excitement. For those who failed 
35Robert G. Cleland, £!2!!! Wilderness ;!;&. Emeire: ! Histor:y of 
California {New York: A. A. Knopf, 1944), P• 121. 
36walton Bean, Cali:fomia: An Interpretive History {New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), PP• 125-135~ 
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to share in the initial wealth, hard work; in the mines was no substi-
tute for the gambling spirit of acquiring wealth and fame in Mexico, 
the mother country of California. To these men, the spirit of mani-
fest destiny served as a rationale for their aspirations and kept 
their dreams of ambition alive. Mexico's wealmess had been revealed 
during the recent war with the United States. Sam Houston and John 
Charles Fremont had showed them the way, and Mexico's inability to 
handl~. its frontier problem gave them an excu~e. 
CHAPTER II 
JOSEPH C. MOREHEAD 
On April .30, 1851, a well organized party o:f men were making 
aJTangements in Los Angeles to march by land to Sonora. They were only 
a portion o:f three hundred men who claimed they were setting out :for a 
prospecting tour o:f the Gila. To the inhabitants of Los Angeles, 
however, it was understood from their preparations that they were 
planning to make a :forcible seizure of Sonora~ 1 
Earlier in February, General Manuel Robles, Mexican Minister of 
War, had received information from J. M. Carrasco, commandante-general 
of Sonora, regarding a movement to make Sonora independent. Carrasco 
thought the plan had originated during the wi?,lter of 1850 and con-
sidered Deputy Paredes partially responsible because of his intima-
tion that Sonorans might tum to the United States in an hour of need. 
The movement supposedly had contacts in California, and may well 
have been responsible for the first American :filibustering expedition 
from California to Mexico. 2 
Two months later Governor John McDougal of California asked the 
state legislature to provide by law :for the apprehension of Joseph C. 
Morehead, Quartermaster General of California. The Governor had re-
1n.A.C., April 5, 1851. 
--
2wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 5~ • 
. -
1 t) 
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ceived infonnation on April 24, that Morehead had left San Francisco 
with nearly all the anns stored in the state arsenal. His destination 
was unknown, but as later events proved, Morehead was heading for 
Mexico. 3 
Morehead had come into notoriety the preceding year as a result 
of his expedition to the Colorado River to punish the Yuma Indians for 
their murder of eleven Americans. 4 During the winter of 1849, John 
Glanton and a company of American outlaws established a fe.,_.ry near the 
mouth of the Gila in order to exploit the heavy traffic crossing the 
river on the way to the gold fields. When the Yuma Indians decided to 
cash in on the profitable business by operating their own ferry, 
Glanton and his men destroyed their boat and killed the Irishman the 
Indians had employed to help operate the ferry. After Glanton refused 
to consult with the Yuma chief about the incident, the Indians in' 
retaliation ambushed and killed Glanton and his cutthroats.5 
Fearful that the Indians would hann Americans descending the Gila 
3D.A.c., April 28, 1851~ 
·. ~orehead wa:s a:rfative o'f Kentuc& and had. served as a Lieutenant 
in Colonel Stevenson's Regiment of New York Volunteers during the 
Mexi,can War. In 1849 he served in the California legis:heture, repre-
senting one of the mining districts and was believed to have been the 
law partner of the Attorney General of the state. D.A.C., January 14, 
1851; It is stated in the Daily: Alta on December 8, 1853, that during 
the Mexican War, La Paz was occupied by a portion of the New York 
Regiment. This could very well have been the beginning of Morehead's 
first thoughts of filibustering. 
5D.A.C., January 8, 1851; Glanton had fled from Chihuahua after 
Governor Trias !1ad put an $8,000 reward on his own head for cashing 
in Mexican scalps for Indian sca.J,.ps. He then transferred his opera-
tions to Sonora and then on to the Yuma crossing. Ralph A. Smith, 
"The Scalp Hunters in the Borderlands, 1835-1850," Arizona and the 
West, VI (Spring;, 1964), PP• 21-22. . 
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and crossing the Colorado, Governor Peter Burnett directed the 
sheriffs of Los A:p.geles and San Diego counties to enlist sixty men to 
punish the Yumas. These men were to be commanded by General Joshua 
Bean of San Diego, who was to use his discretion in operating the ex-
pedition. He in turn commanded Morehead to direct the campaign and 
to def;ray the expenses by using drafts in Bean's name, but drawn on 
the treasury of the state of California. Norehead, consequently, 
informed the rancheros in the countryside that' these drafts would be 
reimbursed by the state and the scrip could even be used to pay their 
taxes. Convinced, however, that the drafts had an inherent power of 
authority, Morehead did not hesitate to requisition and even confiscate 
cattle, horses, and property from the rancheros, even if they objected 
to the "Morehead scrip. 116 
The expedition finally reached the river, and Morehead and his 
company took; possession of the Yuma crossing. After failing to make 
a treaty with the Yumas, fighting erupted and the Indians were forced 
to retreat up river. Morehead then laid waste their crops and posses-
sions, leaving the area in a complete state of destruction and chaos. 
Not content with the destruction he had caused the Yumas, Morehead then 
turned his men upon parties of Mexicans returning from the mines. 
Claiming that the Yumas would take their arms from them and use them on 
his men, he took more than a thousand guns, pistol~ and weaponry and 
threw them into the Colorado River.7 It is uncertain when the expedi-
6n~A.C., January 14, 1851; Thomas W. Sweeney, Journal., 1842-1853, 
ed. by AHhur Woodward (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1956), p. 225. 
7sweeney, Journal, p. 231; D.A.C., January 20,.1851. 
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tion disbanded, but it made no one happy. In January, 1851, Governor 
McDougal transmitted to the state Senate a detailed report concerning 
the operation. 8 
Possibly during the Yuma campaign Morehead began laying plans for 
h:i,s filibustering expedition into Mexico. Less than a month after the 
governor reported the Yuma journey to the legislature, Morehead showed 
up in San Francisco attempting to locate a building for a state arsenal 
! 
in which to store five hundred stands of arms. 9 Apparently, he ob-
tained some of his weapons from these and used them to outfit his 
expedition, since the editors of the Dail¥~ observed the weaponry 
10 
a month later and counted only 120 stands. Furthermore, the 
Governor on April 27 transmitted information to the legislature that 
Morehead also had sold a portion of 400 muskets and 90, 000 cartridges 
without government authority. He also said he had not authorized 
Morehead to rent a building in San Francisco for a state arsenai.11 
Morehead already had left San Francisco, and by now the Governor 
/ 
was aware that he was, supposedly, on his way to Mazatlan. In an 
effort to thwart this plan, the governor asked the legislature to pro-
'ri,de a reward for the appreheneion of Morehead before he had a chance 
to reach ~exican territory.12 The legislature, however, seemed little 
concerned about the affair. A resolution was made, authorizing the 
8 n~A.c., January 26, 1851. 
9 D.A.C., February 21, 1851. 
lOibid. ; March 21, 1851. 
11n.A.C., April 27, May 2, 3, 1851. 
12n.A.C., April 27, 1851. 
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Governor to o.fier a $1,500 reward for Morehead's arrest, but the 
motion was soon postponed indefinitely. Meanwhile, Morehead had taken 
the money from the illegally sold arms and had outfitted his fili-
bustering expedition for Mexico.13 
On April 20, Morehead and some forty passengers loaded nearly all 
of the state arms on board the barque Josephine and quietly slipped out 
of San Francisco harbor.14 Although it was reported that Morehead 
was headed for Mazatl~, it is possible that he was planning on 
joining several other expeditions either in Sonora or Lower California, 
for in March and April it had been reported in Los Angeles that 
several parties of men numbering from twenty .... five to one hundred had 
left the area for Sonora. At the same time that Morehead was out-
fitting his own filibusters, two other divisions were preparing to 
leave Los Angeles for parts of Mexico. One was to march by land to 
Sonora while the other was to sail for La Paz.15 
Several days after Morehead's party left'San Francisco, the,iy 
arrived in San Diego with the intention of picking up more supplies 
and men. They had planned to sack the city and then continue on to 
Lower California. But after seeing the poverty in the area, a number 
of the men felt the expedition could not be properly provisioned and 
returned to San Francisco.16 
l3H. Bret Melendy and Benjamin F. Gilbert, The Governors £! 
California: Peter !!• Burnett to Edmund Q:. Bro~Georgetown, 
California: The Talisman Press, 1965), p. 43. 
14:o.A,C., April 26-28, 1S5le 
-
l5J. Fred Rippy, ~United States and Mexico (New York: A. A. 
Knopf, 1926), p. 87, ;citing Los Angeles Star, May 26, 185L 
16 D.A.c., May 17, 1S51. 
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Shortly after their arrival, news of a reward reached the city 
and the mayor posted a guard for Morehead's arrest, forcing him to 
cross the border into Baja California for two days. Meanwhile, the 
collector of the port searched the Josephine, but found its papers in 
proper order and was unable to locate any arms on board. Consequently, 
without the presence of Morehead and no sign of contraband arms, the 
collector found no reason to seize the vessel.17 
When Morehead returned to town, he found that the remaining 
party of this men hE!-d made a general nuisance of themselves by en-
gaging in several drunken brawls. Not wanting to antagonize the city 
officials more, since his presence had already been called to the 
attention of the port authorities, he a!:ecruited a party of forty-five 
men and on May 11 left San Diego. Shortly before he departed, the 
port collector instituted another thorough search 6£ the Josephine, 
but still discovered nothing to justify its seizure.18 Morehead had 
informed his men, however, that a vessel had already left the port 
loaded with firearms and supplies.19 
The governor of Lower California, Don Manuel Castro, was in San 
Diego at the same time that Morehead was attempting to refit his 
expedition. At first he was quite apprehensive about the possible 
invasion of his couµtry; but after seeing the character of the fili-
busters and their severe need for provisions and money, he soon "felt 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid. 
19 D.A.c., June 5, 1851 
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the country is safe, n 20 This indicates that either Morehead or some of 
his men had led the residents of the area to believe their destination 
was Lower California. 
The two other divisions which had left Los Angeles for Sonora and 
Baja California were still following through with their scheme, The 
company that departed by sea, at the same time that Morehead was 
sailing from San Francisco, reached La Paz on July 21.. There it 
apparently vanished, It is possible the men slipped away under the 
guise of disappointed miners, for the Mexican central government had 
ordered troops and artillery to the territory the previous May. 21 
If Morehead really had planned on landing at La Paz, as Castro's re-
sponse seems to indicate, this show of force by the Mexican government 
could have prompted him to sail on to a more hospitable state. The 
other group of men which had gone by land reached Sonora sometime in 
July also. The men then scattered in several groups, going to San 
Javier, Arispe, and San Ignacio, Apparently they caused little 
trouble and were not expelled until November. 22 
On May 26, several men who had been connected with Morehead's 
party passed through Los Angeles on their way back to San Francisco. 
Although they reported that the expedition was bound for Sonora to 
revolutionize the state, it is doubtful that Morehead went to either 
Sonora or Baja California. Sometime during the latter part of May, the 
barque Josephine and the "notorious Morehead expedition" sailed into 
20 !2.:!.:Q•, May 17, 1$51. 
21Rippy, United States and Mexico, pp. B7-SS; Bancroft, History 
of California, p. 5S4. 
22.aancroft, History .£!. California, P• 584. 
port at Mazatl~.23 What then happened to the filibusters remains a 
mystery. 2.L+ 
The failure of Morehead's expedition did not dampen the spirits 
23 
of Californians wanting to fulfill their own destiny and glory. More-
head had set an example; more planning was needed, and the support of 
the Mexican citizenry would be essential if one was successfully to 
colonize or revolutionize Sonora or Lower California. No sooner had 
the rumors of Morehead's expeditions faded than a Frenchman, the 
Marquis Charles de Pindray crossed the border into Sonora, soon to be 
followed by another French nobleman, the Count Gaston Raoul de 
Raousset Boulbon. 
These me~, like so many of their compatriots who failed to reap 
the rich profits of the gold rush, wefused United States citizenship 
and turned their eyes southward. Unlike Morehead, however, they were 
invited to Mexico by officials who were still aware of the need to 
establish frontier colon;i.es; the French settlements would serve as a 
buffer between the more inhabitable regions of the northern tier of 
states and the troublesome Apaches and aggressive Americans. 
When William Schleider, the Mexican vice-consul at San Francisco, 
extended Pindray an invitation to come to Sonora, the Frenchman quickly 
established a headquarters and raised sufficient funds to provide a 
ship for his volunteers. He then tried to enlist the support of 
Raousset, but the Count ':refused~him assistance; . the Count.· was in the 
23n A C J · "'~6 I.851 • • • , une ·i::.:7 , . • 
~orehead showed up in Sacramento in May, 1852, trying to outfit 
another expedition for Sonora. It was reported he was last seen 
sailing down the Sacramento River with a band of followers. D.A.C., 
May 7, 1852. 
midst of planning his own scheme for colonization. Undaunted by this 
refusal, Pindray and eighty-eight adventurers set sail from San Fran-
cisco on November 21, 1851. 25 
On December 26, the Sonorans joyously received them at Guaymas. 
Mexican merchants were eager to makB them welcome, and the authorities 
fulfilled their promises of horses, mules, provisions, and munitions 
of war. By the beginning of 1852 the French colonists were ready to 
start for the Cocospera valley near the northern frontier, and in 
March they reached their destination. Although the mines of the 
northern area was the ultimate objective, Pindray decided to establish 
an agricultural colony there and to· spend some time putting the Apaches 
on the defensive. After a few months, however, it became apparent that 
the Sonoran government was unwilling to continue the promised aid. 
The Apaches were continually haraasing the settlement, but no assis-
tance seemed to be forthcoming. Meanwhile, in March 1852, Miguel 
Blanco, the commandante-genera1 and inspector of colonies, had brought 
sufficient resources to place 1, 500 men under arms. A few weeks later 
he openly displayed his distrust of the colonists. 26 
Finally, out of desperation, Pindray and several of his followers 
travelled to Ures to secure the promised supplies. While there, 
25Wyllys, French !!:!, Sonora, p. 58; William Oscar Scroggs, Fili-
busters and Financiers: The Story 2f William Walker !B!! ~Associates 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), pp. 21-22. 
26Bancroft, North Mexican States, pp. 673, 676; In April, 1852, 
as a result of the refueal by the French minister to Mexico to assume 
any responsibility for Pindray and his men, Manuel Robles, the Mexican 
Minister of War, informed Blanco to keep a close watch on the colony. 
If any "suspicious" activity erupted from Pindray' s presence, Blanco 
was to imprison him at once. By this time the French colony had grown 
to about 150 men, Wyllys, French in Sonora, pp. 6o-62. 
. .-
25 
Pindray's truculent attitude offended the state authorities and con-
firmed. their distrust of the colony. Ill feeling between the Frenchmen 
and the Mexicans continued to grow, and Pindray was ordered to leave 
the state. While encamped on their way back home, the French found 
Pindray shot :i.n his tent. Whether he shot himself out of desperation 
or whether he was assassinated is uncertain. Following his death, 
despite Apache raids, nurrerous desertions, and privation, the colony 
continued to struggle along throughout the summer. By autwnn the re-
maining colonists decided to abandon their eettlement and join the 
ambitious project of Raosset Boulbon.27 
During January, 1852, while Sonorans were vigorously applauding 
Pindray for his ant~cipated success in colonizing the frontier, Juan 
Nepomuceno Almonte was making an appeal to the Mexican Senate to 
institute a national project to populate the borderlands. The plan 
of 1848 had failed miserably, and Paredes' proposals of 1850 were not 
accepted. Still, the Indian raids continued, and, as Morehead's 
expedition proved, many Americans were still looking toward northern 
Mexico as if the borderlands were only for their taking. 
Almonte's proposals differed from those of his predecessors, 
however. His foremost concern was to contain the Indian roonace. In 
d~scribing the plight of the frontier population, he spoke of how 
"daily their inhabitants are murdered, the:i.r houses sacked and their 
fields burned by the various tribes of barbarians that ceaselessly 
27Wyllys, French in Sonora, ppe 61-64, 
26 
invade their lands. n28 ije also considered the Indian problem a po-
tential danger to the Republic's interior if allowed to go unchecked. 
Almonte proposed to remedy the situation by inducing Europeans, native 
Me.xi.cans, and residents of Hispanic-American republics to take up 
lands on the frontier and within the interior wastelands. He even 
suggested that agents be sent to Europe to encourage emigration and 
to use Mexico's consular offices in America to urge foreigners to take 
advantage ot the colonization program. 29 
'rhe potential threat of the United States was never mentioned in 
either his introductory remarks or his text. Yet, Almonte must have 
reasoned that American expansionism wolll;d be seriously hamp~red if a 
stable, economically independent frontier population could be estab-
lished by immigrants who would become excellent Mexican citizens. 
Neverthel~ss, like tnose proposals of Paredes' two years earlier, 
Almonte's suggestions were never enacted into law, 
Almonte's thoughts must have made an impact upon several govern-
ment officials, however, far in the spring of 1852 a French expedition 
under the guidanqe of Raousset Boulbon arrived in Sonora to clear the 
region of Indians. The Count, like Pindray, had been attracted to 
Mexico by stories of rich Sonoran mines. He was also a member of the 
disenchanted French in Califo?Ilia, and knew that if given the oppor-
t'Wlity he could come to terms with the Mexican government; he would 
be able to satisfy their desire to colonize the frontier and his to 
280die B. Faulk, trans,, "Projected Mexican Colonies in the 
Borderlands, 1852," Journal of Arizona History, X (Summer, 1969), 
P• 120. 
29Ibid,, PP• 120-128. 
reap the profits from placer mines in Sonora. At the insistence of 
M. Patrice Dillon, the French consul at San Francisco, to secure aid 
from the Mexican government before departing for Sonora, he travelled 
to Mexico City and presented to President Manuel Arista his mining 
and colonization scheme. 
Convinced that his plan would work, both the French minister to 
Mexico, Andrew Levasseur, and several government officials· gave their 
approval. Since President Arista, Jose Calvo, the French consul at 
Guayma,s, Jose Aguillar, governor, and Cubillas, provisional govemor 
of Sonora, agreed to be the principal directors, Raousset received 
financial support of the French banking house of Jecker, Torre, and 
Company to underwrite his organization called J&, R@stauradora. 30 In 
return for the Mexican concession of land, mines, and placers, Raousset 
was to take 150 fully anned Frenchmen: .to Sonora in order to discover 
and hold :pos13ession of the mines and to withstand the Apache menace. 
In this way both mining and agricultural colonies could be estab~:: 
lished. 31 
Raousset returned to San Francisco, opened a recxuiting office, 
and quickly enlieted the help of Z/O compatriots. On May 19, 1S52, 
they sailed out of San Francisco. When they landed in Guaymas on 
June 1, the welcorre accorded them by the residents was as jubilant as 
that given Pindray. But the official response had changed tempo over 
30Thomas Robinson Warren, Dust and Foam, or, Three Oceans and Two 
Continents (New York: Cha;t"les Scribiler, 1S5S}, p. 203; The Mexican 
banking house put $35,000 at his imrre<U.ate disposal for supplies and 
promised him another $25,000. Bancroft, NIJrth Mexican States, PP• 
676-677. 
31i3ancroft, North Mexican States, p. 677. 
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the past few months. While Raousset had been recruiting, one of the 
largest concerns in Mexico, the House of Barron, Forbes and Company, 
had formed another league in order to reap the benefits of the rich 
Sonoran mines. Finding that this new company had more rreans and in-
fluence than the Restauradora, the two contending governors of Sonora, 
Aguilar and Cubillas, and the French consul at Guaymas joined the new 
enterprise and deserted Raousset.32 
The most influential individual that had been won over to the 
rival company was General Miguel Blanco. In May he issued his own 
decree to promote colonization. His plan, however, contained several 
stipulations obviously designed to hinder the French operation. The 
measure offered several inducements to foreigners but added that they 
must become Mexican citizens, renounce their allegiance to their 
former:Bovemunent, obey all authorities, enlist in ~he militia, and 
give a portion of all income to the church, schools and public works. 
Naturally these requirements had not been outlined to Raousset during 
the negotiations in Mexico City.33 
After remaining in Guaymas for a month, Raousset realized that 
Blanco was deliberately impeding his march to the inter.tor. Disgusted 
wi,th the delay and weary of Blanco' s intrigues, he finally received 
permission to depart, but only by a route which was twice as long and 
much more difficult than the one he had originally intended to use. 
Ignoring the general's orders, the expedition set out by the shortest 
route and in August reached the pueblo of Santa Anna,, only a few days 
32rhid.; Robinson, Dust and Foam, P• 204. 
33scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers, pp. 26-27. 
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journey from their mining claim. Blanco, fearful of the success of the 
French, issued an ultimatum allowing them only one recourse for their 
disobedience. They could renounce their nationality and become Mexican 
~oldiers, or they might continue to explore the region but not take 
possession of any mines. Third, the Count was given the opportunity 
to reduce his company to fifty men and become laborers in the service 
of the Restauradora.34 
Raousset denounoec;i the ultimatum as a breach of faith and gave his 
men the choice of leaving, accepting the terms, or joining him in an 
attack on Hermosillo, the capital and General Blanco:' s headquarters. 
He then appealed to the people, posing as a chlillIIPion of Sonoran inde-
pendence, and on September 21 raised the banner of a free Sonora. Con-
fident that his cause was just, he sent agents to San Francisco and 
Mazatl~ for reinforcements. 3~ 
On October 14, he declared "that within two hours I shall make 
myself master of it if opposition is shown. 1136 Although Blanco had 
stationed over 1,200 men in the city, Raousset made his word goodo 
But the 12,000 inhabitants had no desire to render allegiance to a 
foreign master. Manuel Maria Gandara, the new governor of Sonora, 
and other prominent authorities also refused to· give any aid to the 
betrayed French. Afraid to remain in the interior, the Count then 
executed a march to Guaymas, By now he and several of his officers 
were extremely ill and after reaching the city Raousset allowed himself 
34rhid. 
35Bancroft, North Mexican States, p. 678. 
36Ibid. 
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to be takep inside the city for treatment. The rest of his men, 
surrounded by nationalists and cut off from supplies, entered into 
annistice negotiations with Blanco. On November 4, they agreed to 
surrender their arms and aco~pted an indemnity of $11,000. By December 
most of them had departed.37 
~ Raousset refused to sign the agreement and went to Mazatlan to 
recuperate. Finally, he was summoned to San Francisco by Dillon. 
Upon returning, he found that the sentiment of Califomians was one 
of great excitement and admiration for his heroic exploits. After 
learning that a revolution had brought Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to 
the Mexican presidency, and that Sonora had been lowered to a sub-
ordinate department, the ambitious Frenchman resumed his plans for the 
occupation of Sonora. When Andrew Levasseur notified Dillon that 
Santa Anna had urged him to invite Raousset to Mexico, the Count made 
a second trip to the capital city in June, 1853, 38 
At first Santa Anna was anxious for the French to coionize the 
frontier and made Raousset a liberal concession and stipulated a 
monthly pay for five hundred Frenchmen to serve as a garrison on the 
frontier. But after four months of negotations, Banta Anna changed his 
mind and suggested that the Count become a Mexican citizen and accept 
a colonelcy in his army. After he indignantly refused the president's 
offer, Raosset was proclaimed an outlaw and forced to flee for his 
37warren, Dust and Foam, pp. 206-207; Bancroft, North Mexican 
States, p. 680; Scroggs-;--Fil.ibusters and Financiers, '""P72s • 
. -
38.sancroft, North Mexican States, PP• 682-683. 
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life. Upon his retum to San Francisco, however, he found that those 
who had suggested they would join his second company were busily making 
preparations to join a new American expedition. Public interest was, -
now centered on William Walker, prince of the filibusters. 39 
39Ibid.; Scroggs, Fil;ibusters ~ Financiers, pp. 29-30; Rippy, 
United States ~ MeJQ.co, P• 97. 
CHAPTER III 
WILLIAM WALKER 
William Walker was only twenty-six when he arrived in San Fran-
cisco in June 1850. His past was a record of achievement for such a 
young man, but also one o:f restlessness and discontentment. He was 
bom on May 8, 1824, in Nashville, Tennessee, the eldest of four 
children. At the age of fou,rteen he graduated from the University of 
Nashville, and he received his M. D. degree from the University of 
Pennsylvania at nineteen, He then went to Paris to study medicine for 
another year, and then stayed yet an extra year visiting the cities 
of Europe. 
When he retumed to Nashville in 1845, althou.gh declared the 
most accomplished surgeon that ever visited the city, he found the 
study of law was more to his liking. He studied briefly in Nashville 
before moving to New Onleans, where he was admitted to the bar. His 
law career was brief, for he soon turned to journalism. In the winter 
of 1848 he became part owner of the conservative New Orleans Crescent. 
Ironically, while serving as one of the editors, his editorials 
severely criticized and ridiculed the filibustering designs on Cuba. 
While at New Orleans, Walker made two acquaintances w}lo would 
have an influential impact on his life. The first was Edmund Randolph, 
clerk. of the United States Circuit Court, whom he would meet again in 
San Francisco. The other was Helen Martin, with whom he fell in love 
33 
and decided to marry. During their courtship, however, she died of 
yellow fever. Following her death, a noticeable change came over the 
studious Walker; his quiet, very silent manner changed to one of daring 
ambition. 
Feeling that nothing was now worthwhile in New Orleans, he joined 
the rush to California, After arriving in San Francisco, he again 
turned to journalism and became one of the edito;rs of the Daily Herald, 
where he incurred the wrath of District Judge Levi Parsons for attack-
ing his negligence 'in regard to the crime and lawlessness of San 
Francisco. After Judge Parsons haled h;i..rn be.fore the court, adjudged 
him guilty of contempt, and fined him $500, Wal,ker promptly denied 
the judge's authority and went to jail for refusing to pay the fine. 
With the support of the press, a mass meeting was called on March 9, 
1851, and resolutions were made supporting Walker and calling for the 
:resignation of Parsons. Habeas corpus proceedings were then held by a 
superior court, Parson's decision was reversed, and Walker was set free. 
He then memorialized the legislature for the :resignation of Parsons. 
Although the memorial was to no avail, Walker had become a popular 
hero. Had he been politically ambitious, he could have capitalized 
on the incident. Instead he left San Francisco and went to praptice 
law with Henry P, Watkins in Marysville during 1851 and 1852. While 
there he learned of the Morehead and French expeditions. Again he be-
came restless, and the highly skilled l.awyer-d.octor-journalist began 
dreeming of a new pursuit and decided to try his talent in another 
field. 1 
1All information on Walker's past prior to his arrival in Califor-
nia was taken from Scroggs, Filibusters ~ Financiers, PP• 9-18. 
According to Walker the idea of planting a military colony on 
the frontier of Sonora first entered his mind early in 1852 while he 
34 
was at Auburn, California. H~ and a number of persons in Placer County 
supplied the funds and sent Frederic Emory and a companion to Guaymas 
to contact Mexican officials. They were to infonn them that a party 
of Americans would be willing to protect the frontier from Apache 
raids if the Sonoran government would grant them land near the old town 
of Arispe. But the two agents arrived too late, for Raousset Boulbon 
had already received a favorable acceptance of his plan, and city 
authorities refused to confer with the Americans. 2 
Walker then decided to abandon his scheme, but after hearing that 
Raousset had been expelled from Sonora, he detennined to revive the 
Auburn plan. In June 1853, Walker and his law partner, Watkins, sailed 
for Guaymas with the intention of convincing Manuel Gandara, Governor 
of Sonora, that a group of Americans would be willing to protect the 
frontier for a reasonable offer of tel'ritory along the border. Before 
leaving San Francisco, they secured their passports from the Mexican 
cons'Ql there. What Walker did not know, however, was that as soon as 
he received his passport, the consul immediately dispatched the infor-
mation to Guaymas, infonning the Prefect of the port of his suspicions 
about Walker's intentions. When Walker reached Guaymas, the Prefect 
refused to countersig?l their passports, thus forbidding travel to Ures 
to consult with Gandara. 3 
Walker then sought the aid. of the American consul, Juan A. 
~illiarn Walker, The War in Nicaragua ~Mobile: s. H, Goetzel and 
Company, .18~0) ~ pp. 19~_20 .• · .. :. :'. · . · . , . '. .. · 
3 . ... .. ~· ' . '. 0 
Ibid.; ~~iJlson, ~ !!!2:. ~' p. 211. 
Robinson, who exchanged correspondences with the authorities in 
Gua;ymas but to no avail. Finally, after realizing that the Mexicans 
had no intention of permitting him travel to the interior, Walker de-
cided to retum to San Francisco. Before he left, however Walker 
35 
claimed he had seen and heard enough at Gua;ymas to convince him that a 
small body of Americans could gain a foothold on the Sonora frontier 
under the auspices of protecting frontier settlements, 4 
Also while at Guaymas, he must have made a strong impression on 
its :inhe.bitants. T. Robinson Warren, an American traveller who was 
temporarily residing in Guaymas during the summer of.1853 gave a vivid 
description of Walker: 
His appearance was that of anything else than a military 
chieftain, Below the medium height, and very slim, I should 
hardly imagine him to weigh over a hundred pounds. His nair 
light and towy, while M.s almost white eyebrows and lashes 
concealed a seemingly pupilless, grey, cold eye, and his 
face was a mass of yellow freckles, the whole expression very 
heavy. His dress was scarcely less remarkable than his 
pe:rson. His head was surmounted by a huge white fur hat, 
who~e long knap waved witn the breeze, which, together with 
a very ill-made short-waisted blue coat, with gilt buttons, 
and a pair of grey, strapless pantaloons, made up the en-
semble of as unprepossessing-looking a person as one would ... 
meet in a day's walk. I will leave you to imagine the 
figure he cut in Guaymas with the thermoreter at lQOO when 
everyone else was arrayed in white. Indeed half the dread 
which the Mexicans had of filibusters vanished when they 
saw this their Grand Sachem,---such an insignificant-looking 
specimen. But any one who estimated Mr. Walker by his 
personal appearance, made a great mistake. Extremely taci-
t um, he would sit for an hour in company without opening 
his lips; but once interested, he arrested your attention 
with the first word he uttered, and as he proceeded,•you 
felt convinced that he was no ordinary person. To a few 
confidential friends he was most enthusiastic upon the 
subject of his darling project, but outside of those 
4aobinson, Dust and Foam, p. 211, 
__,... .......... ~
immediately interested, he never mentioned the topic,5 
Walker's aspirations were not that confidential, however. 
Several weeks before he and Watkins had departed for Sonora, he had 
clearly revealed his intentions when bond;s for the "Republic of 
Sonora" were offered for sale in San Francisco. They we~ to be re-
deemed with the first proceeds of the new government. 6 Had the Mexican 
consul heard of this bold design, Walker would probably have been pre-
vented from stepping foot on Mexican soil. 
After returning to San Francisco, Walker let it be known through-
out the city that he had every intention of revolutionizing Sonora. 
In an attempt to rally support for this cause, he told the residents 
that the Sonoran government considered him such a threat that it had 
offered a reward for his head.7 Posing as a champion of humanity and 
justice, he claimed that while in Guaymas the Apache menace was so 
great that "several women of the place" had urged him to return to 
California i~diately and bring back enough Americans to protect their 
families from the Indians. 8 
His agents continued to float rumors about the wealth of the 
region and how the "state of this region furnished the best defense 
5Ibid., PP• 212-213. 
6copy of a Bond issued in D,A.C,, May 1, 1853· 
$500 Independence Loan $500 
The Independence Loan Fund has received of the sum 
of $500, and the Republic of Sonora will issue him or his assigns a 
land warrant for one square league of land, to be located on the 
public domain of said Republic. 
Signed this first day of May 
Wm. Walker Colonel of the Independence Regiment 
7 D.A.c., September 12, 1853. 
a Walker, ~ !B_ Nicaragua, p. 21. 
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for any American aiming to settle there without the formal consent of 
Mexico." Even the relatively conservative Daily Alta stated of 
Sonorans that "their only hope is a war and the occupation of their 
territory by United States troopso"9 
Walker's scheme was changed, however, from what he had initially 
planned. Following Count Raousset's return to San Francisco, Walker 
and Watkins had contacted Raousset in the hope that he would co-operate 
with their project. But Raousset refused for fear that it would lessen 
his own chances of securing a Sonoran grant, since he knew the Ameri-
cans were so thoroughly feared and disliked in Mexico.10 Walker and 
Watkins had also told General Don Jose Castro11 about the first of 
September that an expedition of two thousand men were preparing to in-
vade Sonora. Some of the men were to go by sea, the others by land, 
and all to rendezvous at a location someplace between the mouth of the 
Colorado River and Guaymas, They promised him aid in money and large 
concessions of land in return for his support, which they hoped to use 
in order to rally aid from the Mexican inhabitants. Once the revolu-
tion was completed, they promised him that all of the land in Sonora 
would be divided among its inhabitants. They would then declare it an 
independent province and ask for admission to the United States~ 
Castro refused their offer, but swore that he would not reveal the 
9Ibid., PP• 21.-22; D.AoC., September 11, 1853. 
10 Scroggs, Filibusters ~ Financiers, p. 29. 
11This appears to be Don Jose Castro. He left Sinaloa in 1848 
and moved to Upper California where he lived as a private citizen until 
1853 at Monterrey and San Juan. He then went back to Mexico. In 1856 
he was made sub-jefe politico and military commander of Baja Califor-
nia. Bancroft, History of California, II, PP• 751-752. 
scheme,12 
Watkins proposed a similar plan to one of his old friends, Charles 
Pancoast. After dinner one night, Watkins told Pancoast that he and 
Walker already had over 1, 500 men on their enlistment roll and that he 
would guarantee Pancoast a commission as a lieutenant in the Inde-
pendent Army. Their bold design was to take possession of both Baja 
California and Sonora, as the Mexicans did not haqre enough soldiers 
there to prevent their success. Their intention was to proclaim an 
independent government and then seek recognition from the United 
States, thus, securing a more liberal government for the Mexican in-
habitants. Individual and property rights were to be guaranteed, 
although all public lands and property were to be confiscated. But 
like Castro, Pancoast refused to be a part of Walker's grand scheme •13 
Despite these exaggerations of his plans, Walker's recruiting, 
which had begun in May, continued throughout the summer. By 
September .30, 1853, Walker was ready to set sail. On that day, how-
ever, Captain E, D. Keyes, acting under the orders of Major General 
Ethan Allen Hitchcock, commander of the Pacific Division of the United 
States Army, sei:zed the Arrow, the chartered brig which contained the 
supplies of guns, food, and amrnunition.14 
Hitchcock had heard rumors of the planned expedition in early 
12A. P. Nasatir, trans., "The Second Incumbency of Jacques A. 
Moerenhout," California Historical. Society Quarterly, XXVII (June, 
1948), P• 146. . 
13Anna Paschall Hannam, ed., A. Quaker Forty-Niner: ~Adventures 
of Charles Edward Pancoast on the American Frontier (Philadelphia: 
Philadelphia University Press, 1930), pp • .372-.37.3. 
14n.A.c., October 2, 185.3. 
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July and had de~ided then to uphold President Fillmore's proclamation 
against filibustering.15 On September 22, Hitchcock infonned the port 
collector at San Francisco of Walker's rumored expedition and told the 
collector to contact him about any suspicious movements. When the 
collector reported to Hitchcock the questionable cargo on board the 
Arrow, and upon the advice of the district attorney, Hitchcock promptly 
ordered the brig seized and turned it over to the United States 
marshall. Walker was undaunted, however; the next day he took out a 
writ of replevin, claiming the right of possession of both the· vessel 
16 
and cargo. 
Before the case could be settled, Walker became impatient with 
this interference and decided to leave the port, despite the, delaying 
action of the American authorities, Instead of waiting !or the state 
courts to act, he chartered another brig, the Caroline, and purchased 
the supplies he thought necessary to support his expedition until 
reinforcements could arrive after he reached Sonora. Even this action 
was hampered, when on October 16, port officials seized a full lot, of 
ammunition which was::to be stored on. the Caroline. Rather than risk a 
seizure of the ship, he hurriedly loaded forty-five men on board and 
at one o'clock on the morning of October 17, slipped out of the San 
Francisco harbor and set sail for Sonora.17 
This hasty departure undoubtedly crippled Walker's entire expedi-
15Senate Executive Document ~. 32d Congress, 1st session, Vol. I, 
P• 83. 
16w. A. Croffut, ed. , Fiftfi Years i!!. £!!!!£ !ml Field: Diar:t; of )a,lor 
General. Ethan Allen Hitchcock New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909 , · 
p • .-.400. . . 
17 D.A.C., October 18, 19, 1853. 
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tion. The Arrow had been loaded with provisions and ammunition to 
support at least two hundred men who had been enlisted to begin the 
voyage. But with its seizure and then the confiscation of the ~i-
tion intended for the Caroiine crew, he was forced to start out with . 
I 
only a fourth of his men, leaving the others behind to come later,18 
The 1,500 mile joume1 to Guaymas, the most important port of 
Sonora, would have taken about fifteen days to reach had Walker decided 
I 
to follow through with his original design. But because of the size 
of his force, Walker knew that he had little chance of gaining Guaymas 
and was "thus . forced to make Lower California a field of operations 
until they might gather strength for entering Sonora. 1119 
On October 28 the crew landed at Cape San Lucas, stayed a few 
20 days to requisition supplies and then proceeded to La Paz. There 
they landed November .3, sailing in under the Me~can nag. In less 
than two hours Walker and his men had taken possession of the town and 
captured the governor, Colonel Rafa,el Espionosa. The Mexican nag was 
quickl,y hauled down, and the red and white barred flag of the ''New 
Republic" was hoisted. Walker then prefilumptuously declared himself 
President and proclaimed that "The Republic of Lower California is 
hereby Declared Free, Sovereign, and Independent, and all Allgegiance 
to the Republic of Mexico is forever renounced. 1121 Confident that his 
"New ~public" was an established fact, Walker took great care in 
18Ibid. ; Croffu.t, Fiftl Years !!,! Camp ~ Field, P• 400. 
l9Walker, !!!£ !!,! Nicaragua, P• 19. 
20 D,A.C., December 21, 185.3. 
21 D.A.C., December 8, 185.3. 
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organizing his government. Frederic Emory was made Secretary or State, 
John·M. Je:rnagin Secretary of War, Howard H. Snow Secretary of Navy, 
and officers for the "Independence Battalion" were appointed. Then, 
with one sweep or the pen, he issued decrees abolishing all tariffs 
and proclaimed that "the C:i,. vil Code and Code of Practice of the State 
of Louii;iiana shall be the rule of decision and the Law or the 
22 Land.• n''. 
Walker soon decided that La Paz was not suitable .t'or his govern-
ment, and on November 6 set sail for San Lucas, taking with him governor 
Espinosa and all public docwnents. Just as they were leaving the har-
bor, a Mexican vessel transporting Colonel Juan c. Rebolle~o, who h~d 
been sent to replace E~pinosa, entered the harbor. Rath,er than pennit 
hinf·to land and take the chance of the new governor raising troops for 
the defense of Lower California, Walker seized the ship and took 
Rebolledo hostage. At the s~ time, Walker and his men engaged in 
their first pattle of the expedition when six men of the crew had been 
!ire~ upon after being sent ashore to obtain firewood. Walker re-
sponded by ordering the bombardment of La Paz and landed a force of 
about thirty men. The battle was relatively insignificant, but when 
the news reached California it was described as a great victory "re• 
leasing Lower Califomia from the tyrannous yoke of declining Mexico 
and establishing a new republic. 1123 
The Caroline now sailed on for San Lucas, but owing to the threat 
of a Mexican cutter which was cruising off the Cape, Walker decided to 
22rbid. 
23Ibid,; The Mexicans, likewise, claimed a great victory. D.A.C., 
January 3, 1854· 
stay only one day and then embarked for Ensenada. There h~ would 
attempt to make his republic a reality. 24 They ~ached Ensenada on 
November 29, at which time Walker again used his pen to proclaim his 
authority and power. In his address "To the People of the United 
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States," he attempted to give reasons and justification for his venture 
in Lower California, stating that "the geographical position of' the 
province is such as to make it entirely separate and distinct in its 
interests from the other portions of' the Mexican Republic. But the 
moral and social ties which bound it to Mexico, have been even weaker 
and more dissoluble than the physical. Hence to develop the resources 
of' California and ef'f'ect a proper social organization therein, it was 
necessary to ~ke it independent." 25 
To show that he was equally maganimous to the native inhabitants, 
he then issued his "Proclamation To the People of Lower California" 
stating that he had not .::.come to conquer but "to establish order and 
quiet where before all has been anarchy and confusion." He then 
called upon all, the good citizens to assist him "in carrying out the 
principles we recognize, as the foundation of all our rights, and our 
success." 
26 
Walker sent these addresses with Frederic Emory to Upper Califor-
nia in an effort to secure support for his undertaking and to demon-
strate to the people th~~ his enterprise was one of beneficence and 
· .. 
good faith. Many individuals, however, had already demonstrated their 
24n.A.C., December 8, 1853. 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
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desire to take part in this filibustering endeavor. As soon as news 
of the battle of La Paz reached San Francisco, the excitement was so 
great that a flag of the new republic was raised at the corner of 
Kearney and Sacramento streets, and an office was opened for the pur-
pose of enlisting recruits. Fifty volunteers quickly signed the rolls, 
and anns and ammunition were promised to them. Soon more than two 
hundred recruits were registered and making preparations to leave for 
the. Independent Republic.27 
While waiting for these reinforcements, the filibusters meanwhile 
engaged in several skirmishes with the military colonists of Santo 
Tomas. For several days the Americans were besieged in their adobe 
headquarters. Finally, on December 14, Walker realized his ammunition 
was running low and all would soon be forced to surrender unless his 
men could force the Mexicans to retreat. After learning that Walker 
was planning on leading the charge, a young Irishman, Timothy Crocker, 
voluntee:r;'6d to head the mission. With twenty men he charged into the 
Mexican force and was able to make them retire from the area. Besides 
the loss of two privates and Lieutenant John P. McKibben, one of 
Walker's most trustworthy officers, the victory was dampened by the 
escape of the Caroline. When a group of the filibusters went to get 
more supplies from the vessel, it was seen leaving the beach. While 
the filibusters were b-usy fighting the Mexicans, Espinosa and Re boll- · 
edo convinced the mate of the Caroline that the invaders would all be 
killed. Rather than be taken captive, the governors talked him into 
setting sail, taking the ship back to Guaymas, dropping off the 
27 D.A.C., December 9, 10, 12, 1853. 
govemo:r and ex....govemor at Cape San Lucas on the way.28 
Finally, on December 28, the barque Anita arrived with 2.30 re-
c~ts. But as they had only heard or Walker's great success, they 
brought only guns and ammunition. Realizing that the food supply would 
soon be exhausted, Walker dispatched sixty-five men to capture Santo, 
Tomas only thirty miles away.. They were able to take the town with 
little difficulty and did seize several head or cattle, horses, and 
sheep. But the president's real troubles were only beginning. Several 
or the new arrivals had their own ideas of bow to establish an inde-
pendent republic successfully. To them a steady diet of beef and corn 
should be supplemented by plunder and pillage. As discipline began to 
break, dissension and ·desertions increased. 29 
Walker was still determined to turn his dream into reality. 
Watkins had returned immediately to Alta California for more recruits 
and supplies. Walker knew that because his force pow had almost 
reached three= ,hundred, more discipline was needed, not more troops. 
He reorganized his government and held regular military drills. He 
knew that the longer he stayed in Lower California, the smaller would 
be his chance or reaching Sonora. Lower California was a barren, 
almost uninhabited country, and Walker was aware that his men thought 
th're was little to be gained there; the longer they stayed, the more 
dissension there would be. They must either cross to Sonora or 
abandon their mission. 30 
28. n.A.c., February 5, 1854. 
29 D.A.C., January 10, March 22, 1854 • 
.30 D.A.c., January 10, .30, 1854. 
By January 18, 1854, W$l..ke.r realized that his possibility of' 
success was somewhat less than he had anticipated. Still he was un-
willing to abandon his task and issued four quixotic decrees in an 
effort. to disguise the state of affairs. He now proclaimed the 
"Republic o;f Sonora," divided his new nation into the State of Sonora 
45 
and the State of' Lower California, and carefully outlined the boundaries 
of' each. But this performance failed to produce the new hope he 
needed. Never had suitable action foll.owed his sweeping proclamations, 
and the editors of the Daily; .fil! seemed to express the viewpoint 
of many; they ridiculed the action of Walker and stated that "Santa 
Anna must :feel obliged to the new President that he has not fill?lexed 
any more of his territory than Sonora. It would have been just as 
cheap al).d easy to have annexed the whole of Mexico at once, and would 
have saved the trouble of making future proclamations. 1131 
Dissatisfaction with inactivity and poor food continued to pre-
vail in t:i,.e President's camp. For a while new recruits :from San Diego 
and San Francisco tended to offset the desert.ions; but Walker knew he 
had to have action to maintain his decreasing force. Thus he began 
making preparations for a march to Sonora by way of the Colorado 
Ri 32 ver. 
Afraid that his force would desert. him once the journey began, 
Walker decided to insure the loyalty of his men. In his "Address to 
the Army,'' he spoke of the "glorious enterprise" they were about to 
undertake and called upon his men "to wrest Sonora from the rule of 
31Ibid. 
32iJ.A.C., January 25, Z1, 1854. 
the Ap~che_,and ·make .it~.the :abode 0£ order: and ·ci"IT.ilizatio.n,.'.' claiming 
\ 
that "in such a cause failure is impossible and triumph certain. 11 33 
iE'orty-five men, however, quickly decided that triumph was impossible 
and failure certain, refused to sign the loyalty oath, and departed 
for San Diego. The departure proved contagious, and before Walker 
could leave for Sonora many more refused to abide by his decisions.34 
During the first week of February, a Mexican brig of war arrived 
at Ensenada and blockaded the harbor. A few days later, on February 
11, the United States ship of war, Portsmouth appeared. Although the 
meeting between Walker and officers of the ship was said to have been 
friendly, Walker must have been informed that his adventure was not 
looked upon with favor by the United States. The next day, Walker and 
120 followers made a hasty departure from their headquarters, leaving 
behind the sick and wounded to be picked up by the Portsmouth. The 
long fateful march to Sonora was underway. 35 
The filibusters reached Santo Tomas on February 16, and then 
proceeded on to San Vicente. Until this moment Walker had never 
attempted to gain actual political control over the natives other than 
through his meaningless decrees. On the 21st, however, he ordered the 
inhabitants of San Vicente to meet for a "convention," and if any should 
fail to do so, they would be "severely punished. 1136 
On March 1, the true nature of the convention was revealed. On 
33 D.A.C., February 4, 1854· 
-
34Ibid.; lli!_&., February 16, 1854. 
35 D.A.c., February 19, 1854. 
36 lli!_&., March 15, 1854, 
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that day ten delegates, on behalf of the si,.xty-two members attending 
the convention, signed a declaration stating that ";yesterday, in your 
camp, we solemly renounced all allegiance to every other flag or 
government which was not that of the Republic of Sonora, then repre-
sented before us, and voluntarily taking the oath of allegiance to the 
New Republic, we passed beneath the two barmers in token of submission 
and here offer to serve you faithfully until death. n37 
Although Walker needed the political support of the inhabitants, 
the ens:rgency at t~e tins was obviously .. revealed in the last paragraph 
of the delcaration in which the Mexicans swore that "the provisions we 
have on hand, and may receive in the future, be subject to your com-
misary; which requisitd.ons will always be cheerfully complied with, 
confident that we will be fully reimbursed hereafter." With equal 
magnanimity Walker replied that he believed "the State of Lower 
California will prosper and improve under the Republic of Sonora, and 
prove more fruitful of resource than under the misgovernment of 
Mexico."38 
Through the "voluntary'' efforts of the Mexicans, Walker was able 
to requisition what he thought to be enough supplies to last on his 
journey to the Colorado. On March 20, leaving twenty men behind to 
hold San Vicente, Walker started his two hundred mile trek to .·Sonora 
with a drove of cattle and one hundred. 39 
It took them almost two weeks to reach the Colorado, but the 
37Ib'd' . J. •
38Ibid • 
.39n.A.c., April 26, 1854. 
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journey had been costly. En route, they were attacked by a band 
of Cocopa Indians, who killed several men and stole about twenty 
cattle. More catLle were lost crossing the rugged mountains, and the 
force was soon reduced to a meager diet of beef. They eventually 
~ached the Colorado at a point about six miles above its mouth; but 
the river was so wide at this point that the men had to cross over on 
rafts. The cattle had to swim, and most of them drowned. 40 
They had finally reached Sonora, but the conquerors were in no 
condition to claim victory over their new lands and remained only 
three days. The men were in a lili.serable and destitute condition, and 
dissension again broke ou,t •.. They were in a barren country .without food 
·.·., ·,. 
or c;:lothing for survival or guns for adequate protection. Rather than 
risk starvation, more than fifty men immediately deserted in the dire·c- .· 
tion of Fort Yuma. Finding h:i,s numbers thus reduced, Walker resolved 
to retrace his steps to San Vicente. Thus with thirty-three men and 
only a few head of cattle, Walker abandoned his mission and on April 
6, headed for San Vicente. They arrived there on April 17, surviving 
·the continual harassment given by Guadalupe Melendrez, the notorious 
Mexican outlaw. But after reaching the village they found that the 
men they had left to garrison the city were goneo Some had deserted; 
the others had either been killed or put to flight by Melendrez and his 
eighty followers. 41 Walker now had no choice but to retreat northward. 
On February 26, Melendrez sent him a note offering him freedom to leave 
40Ibid.; San Diego Herald, May 5, 1854, as quoted in Rufus K, " 
Wyllys, ''William Walker's Invasion of Sonora, 1854," Arizona. Historiesl. ' 
Review, Vl (October, 1935), PP• .63-64, 
41§!!!, Diego Herald, May 5, 1854, as quoted:.:Ln .. 'kfylln,· '~Wa.1.ker's 
Invasion of Sonora," pp. 63-64; D.AoC., May 16, 1854. 
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the country if he and his troops would surrender their anns. Walker, 
however, was fully aware of what would happen if they turned themselves 
over to the band of cutthroats and expelled the messenger from his 
quarters. 42 
Melendrez and his party continued to circle and harass the 
s~ruggling force as they marched northward. On the 29th they reached 
Santo Tomas, and the next day continued onruntil they reached Ensenada 
on May 1. Fully aware that Melendrez'~ company greatly outnumbered 
his men, Walker continued the flight until they reached the Tia Juana 
Ranch, only a short distance from the border. On the a.t'ternoon of 
March 8, Melendrez sent word to Walker that he would. not permit him to 
~I 
cross the border until he surrendered his anns. Still convinced that 
the outlaw would only betray his filibusters, Walker replied that "If 
Melendrez wants our arms, he can come and take them; we will not run 
but it will be at his peril." Melendrez stationed his men between the 
filibusters and the border, but nothing could stop the weary force now. 
Walker gave the advance charge and within fifteen minutes they had 
broken the Mexican line and crossed over the border. 43 
Once in the United States they surrendered to a .detachment of 
United States troops under the command of Major Justus McKinstry and 
Captain H. s. Burton. After months of hardship, toil, privation, 
and suffering, Walker and thitj,y .... three men, only a remnant of the 
"Republic's Army," agreed to a parole of honor to go to San Francisco 
and report to General John E. Wool. There they would be charged and 
42san Diego Herald, .May .1.3, 1854, as quoted:· in Wyllys, "Walker's 
Invasion of Sonora," p. 6. 
43 D.A.C., May 16, 1854. 
tried for violation ot the neutrality laws. A week later they were 
in Se.n Francisco awaiting the action ot the federal a~thoritiee.44 
44:rbid. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although it ended the bitter Mexican War, the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo in 1848 between the United States and the Republic of Mexico 
did not end all difficulties between the two nations. As a result of 
that agreement, men like Joseph Morehead and William Walker were quite 
willing to take advantage of the chaotic conditions along the new 
international boundary. Had the Gadsden Treaty not been proclaimed by 
the United States on June .30, 1854, the filibustering activities of 
Morehead and Walker might be given more attention than they are today. 
Although ardent expansionists were still not satisfied, the abrogation 
of Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the settlement of 
the boundary dispute, and the addition of thirty thousand square miles 
for the development of a transcontinental railroad seemed temporarily 
to appease the advocates of "manifest destiny" and eliminated the 
controversial issues that had brought the countries close to another 
confrontation,1 
In Article VIII of the original negotations, Manuel Diez de 
Bonilla and James Gadsden promised a co-operative effort on the part 
1For a complete discussion of the Gadsden Purchase see: Paul Neff 
Ga;rber, The Gadsden Treaty (Gloucester, Massachusetts~ Peter Smith, 
1959); J:-F'red Rippy,~ United States ~Mexico, Chapters VII, 
VIll; J. M, Callahan, American Foreign Jolicy. in M.ex:l,.can Relations 
(New York: The Macmillan Compa,ny, 19.32 , Chapter VII. 
&:;l 
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of both nations to use their naval and military forces to suppress the 
filibustering expeditions. Yet when President Pierce sent the treaty 
to the Senate on February 10 for advice as to its ratification, he 
recommended that the article be changed "to a general stipulation that 
the United States would cheerfully co-operate with Mexico in the 
suppression of all unlawful invasions on both sides of the boundary. 112 
The treaty in its final form, however, contains no reference to fili-
bustering. 3 Consequently, the filibustering activity in Sonora and 
Baja California between 1848 and 1854 must be termed as attempts by 
adventurous, ambitious individuals who saw a chance to secure personal 
wealth, fame, and glory by taking advantage of a weakened neighbor 
under the pretext of "manifest destiny." 
The United States was definitely not fulfilling the stipulations 
of Article n of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Washington's three-
fold task that evolved from that article only increased the difficulty 
of controlling the frontier, for neither country was willing to con-
sider it a sole responsibility; because of the restrictions within the 
article, neither nation could agree upon a co-operative planp The 
United States was trying to reduce military expenditures following the 
Mexican War, while the national government in Mexico was on the verge 
of bankruptcy and in a state of constant civil. and military strife. 
President Arista, however, with his plan of 1848 recognized the 
Indian menace on the frontier and the American threat of expansionism. 
2Garber, Gadsden Treaty, pp. 103-104, 116. Garber also points 
out on page 125 that Senator William M. Gwin of California was the 
one who made the motion to delete Article VIII from the treaty. 
~alloy, Treaties, I, pp. 1121-1125. 
In order to deter both, the military colonization plan was put into 
effect. By 1851, however, it was evident that the colonization 
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scheme was not achieving the anticipated resultso The Indians con-
tinued to plunder the frontier villages, while many Americans were 
still clamoring for the Sierra Madre line. Also by this time , Sonora 
and Baja California were losing many of their native residents to a 
much more attractive offer: potential wealth from the California gold 
mines. 
The discovery of gold in California only added additional fears 
to the already worried Mexican officials. Paredes pointed out what 
the gold rush exemplified; Americans would continue to colonize its 
territory north of the boundary line, and that unless Mexico estab-
lished permanent settlements along its frontier the logical outcome 
would be an overflow of American citizens into the frontier stateso 
Had his plan of 1850 been adhered to, it could possibly have created 
a stable population which would have halted the Apache raids and 
dampened the ambition of American filibusters. Nevertheless, nothing 
was done. 
On the other hand, even if the plan of 1848 or that of 1850 had 
been successful, it is uncertain if it would have prevented More~ead 
from launching the first American filibustering expedition against 
northern Mexico. The gold rush had brought an adventurous group of 
individuals to California, many of whom did not share in the fabulous 
wealth. Since talk of "manifest destiny" was still popular conversa-
tion in all types of circles, the next logical step was to look south-
ward. The supreme government of Mexico failed to institute a national 
colonization plan; the Sonoran government's attempt to protect its own 
fronti~r had been declared unconstitutional, and Paredes waming went 
'Wlheeded. The United States military was unable to enforce Article 
54 
VIII of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the Apache raids continued 
to plague a frightened frontier population. With tales of the rich 
placer mines in Sonora and Lower Califomia to make the risk worthwhile, 
adventurers used conditions on the frontier as an excuse for fili-
bustering. 
Thus with an ill clad, disorganized band of fol.lowers, Joseph c. 
Morehead launched his futile attempt to gain control of Sonora and Lower 
Califomia. However, as no apparent military activity took place as a 
result of the Morehead expedition, its significance lies primarily in 
its effect upon the attitude of the Mexican citizenry and its inspira-
tion to other ambitious men with designs on the northern Mexican states. 
Although Don Manuel Castro, the Govemor of Lower Califomia, had 
expressed little fear of the possible invasion of his state, such was 
not the case with his countrymen at Mazat1'1. To them, the scarcity 
of troops surrounding their city and the limited population of the area 
opened the frontiers to the mercy of anyone bent on their destruction. 
They had heard that three hundred Americans were about to depart from 
/ Upper Califomia bound for either Sonora or Mazatlan. As soon as the 
Josephine sailed into harbor, it was quickly rumored that another five 
ships were on their way to join the filibusterso 4 The residents be-
lieved there were "no patriots willing to sacrifice themsel"ITes uselessly 
in the midst of the apathy and indolence of government officials. 
Either the Yankees or Comanches and Apaches conquer us, 115 Yet 
4n.A.c., June 13, 1851. 
-
5D .A. C, , May 24, 1851, quoting the "Noticiosa de Mazatlan." 
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I governmental officials at Guaymas and Mazatlan were not as apathetic as 
the residents might think. In May, after hearing of the departure of 
three expeditions from California, the authorities promptly put Mazat-
1~ in a state of defense. As soon as the Josephine arrived, the 
I Mazatlan port authorities searched the vessel and found neither the 
6 
men nor any munitions of war reportedly on board. It was evident, 
however, to the Ame.rican consul in Mazat1ifu that a strong prejudice 
against Americans was developing because of the rumors of California 
filib~sters on their way to invade Lower California. 7 
The Trait d' Union, a French paper published in Mexico City, 
expressed the fears of many in that city after hearing of the Morehead 
expedition when it stated that "Sonora and Lower California, unexpec-
tedly invaded will become a new Texas and the American element will 
become so dominant that Mexico will soon lose its rights. 118 By the 
time the information reached the east coast, it was reported that, 
although the Morehead expedition had been a failure, it was believed 
by many that within a short time, Lower California, Sonora, and even 
Tamulipas would "soon be wrested from Mexico and be asking for ad-
mission into the Confederacy." It even went so far as to state that 
the "admission of these territories will form a prominent issue in the 
Presidential elections of 1852. "9 
6wyllys, French in Sonora, PP• 52-55· 
7R. R. Gatton to Daniel Webster, Mazatl~, July 8, 1851, Depart-
ment of State, Despatches from United States Consuls in Mazatlln, 
Mexico, 1826-1906, RG 59, National Archives (Microfilm copy in the 
Oklahoma State University Library). 
8 D.A 0 C,, July 8, 1851, quoting Trait£' Union. 
9D.A.C., August 20, 1851, quoting New York correspondence. 
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On July 9, 1851, the Mexico City El Universal cited an article 
- ---.... ---..-.....;.-. 
that had been published in the New York Sun on June 9. The item re-
marked that Mexico could only enjoy peace and prosperity after it 
had been annexed by the United States; only then could it truly have 
republican institutions. The Ures ~ Y2!. ~Pueblo expressed the fear 
that six hundred Americans were on their way to join the Morehead 
expedition.10 
The attitude of the government in Washington, however, was not 
faborable toward the filibusterso In August of 1849, President Zachary 
Taylor had issued a proclamation against filibustering expeditions, and 
had warned all citizens that participants in such an enterprise could 
not expect the interference of the United States governmmt on their 
behalf should Mexican authorities apprehend them.11 Following the 
Morehead expedition, President Fillmore likewise issued a proclamation 
against filibusters stating that "if they should be captured within the 
juris9.iction of the Mexican authorities they must expect to be tried 
and punished according to the laws of Mexico and will have no right 
to claim the interposition of this Government in their behalf o" He 
went on to "call upon every officer of this Government, civil or 
military, to be vigilant in arresting for trial and punishment every 
12 
such offender." 
Although many Californians were still expounding the merits of 
lORippy, United States and Mexico, ppo 102-103. 
11Senate Executive Document 1, 31st Congress, 1st session, Volo I, 
P• 17. -
12Senate Executive Document i, 32d Congress, 1st session, Vol. I, 
PP• 82,...83. 
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"manifest destiny," most intimated at this time that purchase, rather 
than seizure, would be a better method of acquiring more Mexican terri-
tory.13 The editors of the Dail;y; ill.!, stated that filibustering was 
hardly the proper way and "that a band of adventurers, professing to 
be Americans, should unite and take forcible possession of the domains 
oi' another nation, with whom, after a bloody and, expensive war, we are 
on terms of amity and friendship, is abominableo"l4 'When Morehead 
sailed from San Diego, it was repo+ted that a schooner "was to b~ in 
hot pursuit'' of the Joseph:ine. 15 On the other hand, when Governor 
McDougal asked the legislature to provide $1,500 :for Morehead's arrest, 
the senate seemed unconcerned and made little effort to act on the 
subject at all.16 
Nevertheless, Morehead' s expedition again aroused the fears of 
those who thought that Americans were preparing to take another slice 
oi' Mexican territory. Rather than take a chance on another American 
expedition, the Mexican vice-consul at San Francisco extended an 
invitation to Charles de Pindray in the hope that a French settlement 
would not only protect the frontier population from Indian attacks but 
also halt the tide of American expansion. The settlement was denied 
the promised Mexican aid, however, Pindray was found shot in his tent, 
and the colony wasted away. 
Still, Mexican statesmen were intent on colonizing the ;f'rontier. 
1.3 D.A,i, February B, 21, March 20, April 27, June 2B, August 20, 
September , October 13, 1B51. Many more examples can be located. 
14n.A.Co, April 27, 1$51. 
15 D.A.c., May 17, 1B51. 
16D.A,C., April 30, 1B5lo 
Solely upon the basis of containing Indian incursions into northern 
Mexico, Juan Almonte presented his colonization plan to the Mexican 
Senate in January of 1852. He was certain that European settlers would 
populate the frontier and interior wastelands if given proper induce~ 
ments~ If successful, the Indian problem would be solved, and a 
loyal, financially stable Mexican citizenry would evolve. As with the 
proposals of Paredes in 1850, however, Almonte' s plan failed to be 
enacted. 
Again Mexican authorities turned to the disenchanted French of 
California. With the official backing of leading politicians and one 
of the mc:>st ;i.nUuential banking firms in Mexico, Raousset Boulbon 
accepted an invitation to lead armed Frenchmen into Sonora to withstand 
the Apaches. In exchange, he was to be allowed to discover and take 
possession of rich placer mines. Raousset should have remembered the 
fate of his compatriot, however, for he too was denied the fulfillment 
of Mexican pledges, betrayed by the generals, and forced out of the 
country. But after learning of the excitement his expedition had 
aroused in San Francisco, he decided to appeal to Santa Anna, the new 
Mexican presidento This time, however, his plans were rejected, and he 
was declared an outlaw. By the time he returned to San Francisco, 
public attention was now centered around the "grey-eyed man of 
destiny," William Walker. 
Walker learned of the Morehead and Pindray ~editions while 
., 
practicing law in Marysville. Before he and Watkins decided to send 
Emory to Guaymas in the summer of 1852, he no doubt intended to 
capitalize on the turmoil of the frontier and the mistakes made by 
both men. It was obvious that Morehead's attempt had:been poorly 
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organized and had £ailed to incite the frontier population to revolt 
and seek annexation to the United States. Although the Sonoran 
citizenry had lauded the arrival of Pindray and Raousset, the betrayal 
0£ Mexican officials made the success of their ventures impossiblee 
After the same authorities made it clear to Walker in the summer 
of 1853 that Mexico had no intention of allowing Americans to settle 
their frontiers, it was then he decided that under the pretext of pro-
tecting the inhabitants of Sonora from Indian outrages, he would make 
himself President of an independent republic. 
Walker had hoped to get the support both 0£ the Mexican pqpula-
tion and of the military personnel. 
misjudged the temperament of both. 
It was obvious, however, that he 
Otherwise he woulc;l never 11.ave 
presumptuously offered for sale bonds for the "Republic of Sonora" six 
months before his expedition sailed from San Francisco. He had every 
intention of establishing his personal rule over Sonora and Baja 
California. Yet at the same time he realized that his adventure could 
not succeed without the popular support of the Mexican people. This 
he never received. 
Due to the harassment by American authorities in San Francisco, 
he was unable to initiate his original plan of landing at Sonora, With 
only forty-five men, he knew he could not forcibly take Guaymas, so he 
landed at La Paz instead, After failing to get the reinforcements he 
expected, he retreated northward and set up headquarters at Ensenada, 
a location close enough to make a quick return to the United States 
should the Mexican government tire of his quixotic adventure o 
Despite the fact that the Apache raids had given the frontier 
inhabitants plenty of reason to complain, Walker's many decrees pro-
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claiming protection to the citizenry was not the solution they wanted; 
the intent of the convention at San Vincente was obvious. 
Insufficient supplies always plagued his expedition; thus rein-
forcements only added to Walker's plight. By the time he set foot in 
Sonora, hi1;1 filibuster was already defeated and his "Republic of Sonora" 
meaningless. His followers, disallusioned with their failure to acquire 
immediate wealth, were 'U!lwilling to serve a president who could only 
provide them with beef and corn instead of gold and silver. 
Walker's f~libuster had a variety of effects upon both Mexicans 
and Americans. The Annals .Qf §fill Francisco reflected the attitude of 
most Californians, both prior to and after the expedition; "Had 
Walker's party succeeded in reaching Sonora and been able to stand 
their own for a time or perhaps signally to defeat the Mexicans in 
a pitched battle, ten thousand of our mixed Californians would have 
hastened to their triple-striped two star standard. Against such a 
force, not all the power of Mexico would have been sufficient to dis-
lodge the invaders from Sonora. Other tens of thousands would h;:i.ve 
been thoroughly Americanized." But after evidence of Walker's failure 
began arriving, "the San Franciscan journals had now little mercy on 
the expedition and all connected with it. It was a farce they said; 
and its end was just what they had expected. 1117 
Many government officials in Mexico, Washington, and California 
had little sympathy with Walker. While Watkins was actively seeking 
reinforcements, James Gadsden was negotiating a new treaty with 
Mexico. One California legislator aptly stated the real fear of 
17soule, Annals of San Francisco, PP• 480-481. 
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Walker's expedition when he introduced, a resolution in the legislature 
condemning the venture as unworthy of Amer:i,can citizens "and calculated 
to retard the amicable acquisitions of the States of Chihuahua, Sonora 
and Lower California which our Government is at present desirous of 
effecting. 1118 
Gadsden was extremely disgusted with Walker. 6n August 20, 1853, 
Bonilla informed Gadsden of Walker's visit to Guaymas during the summer 
and claimed that his intentions were "against the tranquility and peace 
of the Territory of Mexico. 1119 On November 15, Bonilla again notified 
Gadsden that he had received reports about the departure of Walker's 
expedition and questioned him as to why federal authorities in Califor-
nia had not suppressed "those expeditions against a neighboring 
nation. 1120 Gadsden immediately replied that government authorities had 
seized arms and ammunition to be used by the filibusters, but that 
Walker and his men had slipped out of harbor and avoided arrest. Al-
though he was sure Wal~r could not successfully carry out his mission, 
he promised to notify Washington so that future missions would be 
21 
stopped. He also informed Bonilla that he had sent a circular to the 
consul at Acapulco, to be transmitted to San Francisco, informing any 
commanding officer of an American vessel to suppress any unlawful de-
18 !h!.!Q,, January 19, 1854. 
19Bonilla to Gadsden, Mexico City, August 20, 1853, Department of 
State, Despatchf?s from United States Ministers iQ. Mexico, 1823-1906, 
RG 59·, National Archivese (Microfilm copy in the Oklahoma State 
U~iv~rsity Library)o 
. '· 20 . ·. 
Bonilla to Gadsden, November 15, 1853, Dept. 2.! State, Des., 
Mexico City. 
21 .. 
Gadsden to Bonilla, November 18, 1853, Dept. oT -State, Des., 
Mexico City.' 
sign on Mexico. He then wrote the president asking him to provide 
stronger measures against filibustering. 22 Walker's action was in-
opportune for Gadsden, for it further convinced Santa Anna that the 
United States was still intent on anne.xipg more Mexican territoryo 
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Later, in January, Gadsden informed the Charleston Daily Cour;i.er that 
"had not the insane expedition caused Santa Anna to set his face reso-
lutely against it," further negotiations probably would have added 
Lower California to the United Stateso 23 
The rumors continued to spread, and by January the American consul 
at Mazat1'1 reported Mexican officials claiming that more than six 
hundred Americans had already landed at Todos Santos and thati three 
hundred Mexican soldiers were being sent to repel the invaders.24 When 
John Cripps, Secretary of the American legation in Mexico, wrote to 
William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, in February, he complained of the 
filibustering invasion and that Mexican newspapers were filled with 
declarations against the United States and her intentions against 
Mexico. 25 Cripps had tried to reassure Bonilla in January that the 
United States was making every effort to bring the expedition to an 
end, but failed to convince the Mexican mini:;iter of his sincerd.ty. To 
Bonill,a, Walker was not only violating existing treaties between the 
United States and Mexico, but in particular the domestic laws of the 
22Gad13den to Bonilla, November 17, 1853, Dept. 2f State, Des., 
Mexico City. 
23Garber, Gadsden Treatl, P• 98, quoting Daily Courier. 
24Gatton to Cripps, January 12, 1854, Dept. of State, ~·, 
Mazat1'1 • 
. } 5cripps to Marcy, February 5, 1854, Dept. of State, ~·, 
Mexico City. 
63 
United States.26 
Still Cripps was adamant and replied that both California and 
federal authorities had made every attempt to prevent Walker's ship 
from leaving harbor. In reply to Walker's violation of American laws, 
Cripps reminded the Mexican minister that only "suspicion" of inten-
tions did not warrant the arrest of a person. 27 
Earlier, in November, Juan Robinson, the American consul in 
Guaymas, had informed Gadsden that the reports of an invasion of Sonora 
were quite alarming to the citizens of Guaymas and that if a United 
States ship of war could be sent to the port to prevent a landing, it 
would greatly reduce the anxiety of the inhabitants th,ere and create 
great confidence towards the American government. 2B By February, 
due to the excitement expressed against Walker's filibuster, Robinson 
was forced to leave the city and go to Mazatl~. 29 A month later it 
was rumored throughout Guaymas that over 1,500 filibusters were in 
Lower California preparing to cross over the Gulf into Sonora. 30 
Federal officials had attempted to stop the expedition. Under 
orders of the president, General Hitchcock had seized the brig Arrow 
26Bonilla to Cripps, January 30, 1B54, Dept. of State, ~· , 
Mexico City. 
27Cripps to Bonilla, February 1, 1B54, Dept. £!.State, ~·, 
Mexico City. This is an issue that Walker would use in his trial. 
28aobinson to Gadsden, Guaymas, September 25, November 5, 1B53, 
Department of State, Despatches ~United States Consuls in Guayrnas, 
Mexico, 1S32~1B96, RG 59, National Archives. (Microfilm copy in the 
Oklahoma State University Library). 
29Robinson to Cripps, February 22, 1B54, Dept. £!State, ~·, 
Guaymas, 
3oD.A~c., March 24, 1B54. 
64 
and forced Walker to charter the Caroline and make a hasty departure. 
Though public opinion set in against Hitchcock, on December 16, 1853, 
he received word from Jefferson Davis, the new Secretary of War, that 
his work as commander of the Department of the Pacific was commend-
able. 31 
On Jan'l.\ary 9, 1854, Davis assigned Brevet Major General John E. 
Wool as the new commander Of the department. 32 Wool had no intention 
of allowing cont:i,nu.ed recruitment for Walker's expedition. On 
January 18, President Pierce, after receiving the news of Walker's 
venture, issued a proclamation "warning all persons who shall connect 
themselves with 811.Y such enterprise or e~edition," and called "upon 
all officers of this Govemioont, civil and military to use any effort 
which may be in their power to arrest for trial and punishment every 
such offender. n33 Even before the proclamation, Davis had informed 
Woql to "use all proper means tq detect the fitting out of armed 
expeditions against countries wi~h which the Un,ited States are at 
peace" and to co-operate with the civil authorities in maintaining 
the neutrality laws.34 
Wool took immediate action and on March 1 reported the arrest of 
Watkins, which he felt would inevitably end Walker's expedition for 
31croffut, Fifty Years in Q.!!!!e. !ill!, Field, PP• 402-405. 
32iiouse Executive Document 88, 35th Congress, 1st session, Vol. X, 
P• 5. . 
33united States Statutes ~Large, 3Z<i-33d Congress, Vol. X, 
PP• 1177-1188. . 
34Senate ~cutive Document 16, 33d Congress, 2d session, Vol. VI, 
PP• 7-8. -
lack of reinforcements,35 On March 21, Watkins was brought before the 
federal District Court and charged with violating section six of the 
Neutrality Law of 1818, which stated that any person setting on foot, 
providing or preparing means for military expeditions against nations 
at peace with the United States would be declared "guilty of a high 
misdemeanor and shall be fined not e~ceedip.g three thousand dollars, 
36 
and imprisoned not more than three years." The questions for the 
jury was to decide whether or not an illegal expedition had been pro-
moted by Watkins, and if so, did he take part in it, 37 
Hoping to win the sympathy of the jury, Edmund Randolph, one of 
the defense attorneys, elaborated on the Apache curse of northern 
Mexico and the corruption and incompetency of Santa Anna's government. 
He then went on to show that Watkins had no intentions of invading 
Mexico until after the Anita left port. Henry S. Foote, the other 
attorney for Watkins, attelilpted to prove the law of 1818 unconstitu-
tional.. Judge Ogden Hoffman, however, pointed out to the jury that the 
constitutionality of the law had already b'een proven and that the jury 
must judge the guilt or innocence upon the basis of tbe evidence in 
violation of that law. Finally, on March 25, Watkins was found guilty 
and recommended to the mercy of the court. On April 8, he was con-
victed and fined $1, 500. 38 On April 4, Captain George R. Davidson was 
released for lack of evidence, but on April 11, Frederic Emory, 
35House ~·Doc.~' 35th Cong., lat sess., Vol, X, PP• 10-11. 
36united States Statutes fil. Lare;e, Appendix, Vol. III, p. 449, 
37D.A.C., March 22, 1S54. 
38n.A.C., March 23, 24, April 8, 1854. 
Walker's Secretary of State, changed his plea to guilty and like 
Watkins was fined $1,500. 39 
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Following the arrest of Watkins and Emory, public opinion started 
turning against the filibusters as Californians began to realize that 
Walker's sweeping proclamations could not be backed by deeds. Reports 
of his demise began to drift back to San Francisco, and only a few were 
surprised with his surrender. 40 Walker was not arraigned until June 
2, at which time he pleaded "not guilty." Because of the absence of 
Frederic Emory and then later of Judge Hoffman, however, his case did 
not come to trial until October. 41 
Edmund Randolph and Calhoun Benham were the defendant's counsel, 
Walker also acted as an attorney for his own defense, and in his 
opening statement to the jury he claimed that "I shall introduce evi-
dence to show that at the time of leaving this port, my intention was 
to proceed to Guaymas and thence by land to the frontiers; and I shall 
also prove that it was only after we had got to sea and beyond the 
territory of the United States, that this intention was changed, so as 
to land at La Paz , and previously to this, such was not my intention 
to proceed and land there in a hostile manner. 1142 
Ass. W. Inge, the district attorney, pointed out, the jury would 
39D.A.C,, April 4, 11; Senate Exe ~· 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 53; Emory was arrested in San Diego on March S. D.A.C., March 15; 
Dr. Hoge, Walker's surgeon was arrested earlier. D.A.C., March 3; 
Davidson had been arrested in San Diego the same time that Watkins 
was apprehended. D.A.C., February 25, 1854. 
40 D.A.C., March 20, June 5, May lB, 1854; Hou.se g. J22£• BS, 
35th Cong., 1st sess., P• 49. 
41 l2.=!:Q., May 27, June 3, 9, October 7, 11, 12, 
42n.A.C., October 18, 1854. 
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have t<:> determine the intention of Walker at the time of leaving the 
territory of the United States. If he did plan on making a hostile 
landing in Mexico before leaving, then he would be guilty of violating 
the neutrality Statute of 1818. 
Benham still denied the constitutionality of the neutrality law 
and explained quite well Walker's attitude toward Section VI when he 
asked, "What nation would be willing to be bound by such a law?--only 
the weak to protect themselves against the strong. We all know that 
international law is nothing but force •••• we cannot shackle and bind 
down t~e progress of nations, as we may regulate the actions of 
individuals. 1143 
As in Watkins' case, Randolph then spolce of Walker's expedition 
"as one of the highest character and glory. 11 It was intended to "drive 
back the savage Apaches." As Raousset had been betrayed, it was 
Walker's duty to continue the enterprise. Walker then made an eloquent 
appeal on his own behalf stating that the inhabitants of Sonora had 
begged him to return with enough Americans to "drive back the Apaches"; 
but because of the interference of U. s. authorities, he was unable to 
take enough men to help the oppressed Sonorans: "They were bound on 
an errand of humanity and their mission was higher authority than 
international law," He had "hoped to rescue a land from savages and 
make it the abode of order and civilization. 1144 Despite the verdict 
of the jury, "he had one consolation, of which no ignorant or malicious 
43Ibid. 
44-o.A.C,, October 19, 1854q 
person could :rob hi.m--it was that of a conscience void of offence. 1145 
Inge ridiculed the statements of the defense and declared to 
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the jury that even if the humane purposes of the filibusters were just, 
the expedit!on was still in violation of the law. When the judge 
charged the jury for a verdict, he stated that the constituionality was 
not the question, but its violation by Walker: "If, however, the 
chartering a vessel and putting arms and munitions of war on board, the 
going out to sea, the leaving at night and the hostile acts of the 
party after they had landed in Lower California, if these facts were 
sufficient to come to the conclusion in the minds of the jury that 
hostility was meditated before the expedition had set sail, then they 
might find the defendant guilty." The jury had little trouble in 
fllB.king a decision, After only eight minutes, they returned a verdict 
of not guilty.46 
To Juan Almonte, an able Mexican statesman, the trial of Walker 
exemplified the indifference that Californians had manifested before 
and after Walker's expedition. 47 As early as January, 1854, Senator 
William M. Gwin of California practically foretold the outcome of 
Walker's trial. In arguing with his colleagues over the ability of the 
United States government to enforce the neutrality laws, he contended 
that as long as adventurous spirits resided in a country such as 
45Ibid. 
46 D.A.c., October 20, 1854. 
-
47Garber, Gadsden Treaty, p. 163; Even be:f,'ore the trial, Gadsden 
commented on the sincere distrust of most Mexicans toward the American 
system and how the Mexican newspapers continued to assail the "progress 
of liberty." Gadsden to .Marcy, Mexico City, September 2, 1854, Dept. 
of State, Des., Mexico City. 
- . ..,...._ 
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California, as long as the principle of territorial expansion was 
recognized, and with countries such as Sonora and Baja Califo;mia lying 
next to the United States "you will find citizens of the United States 
engaged in such enterprises. 1148 Both Joseph Morehead and William Walker 
were products of their own time, They were not patriots, but only 
pirates seeking personal glory under the guise of "manifest destiny." 
4SCongressional Globe, .3.3d Congress, lst se~sion, (1S5.3-1S54), . 
Vol. XXVIII, pt, 1, p, 2&7. 
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